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Abstract
The Sharīʿa codification, privatization and reconciliation present three reform
movements to scientize Sharīʿa in the manner of liberal positivism. The scientism of
Sharīʿa makes Islamic law predictable, rational and objective. Its final goal is to protect
Sharīʿa from the political encroachments of the ruling elites and facilitate Sharīʿa
implementation in a post-colonial era. The three reform movements are, however,
incapable of harmonizing Sharīʿa with the liberal norms of a scientized law. Sharīʿa
codification makes the law predictable but neglects Sharīʿa’s undemocratic methods of
decision-making. Sharīʿa-compliant legislation is still the monopoly of the Muslim
jurists and the ruling caliph. Sharīʿa privatization secularizes Sharīʿa-based arguments
in the public sphere, but in the meantime, creates a politics of mistrust due to the
suspicion of an Islamist hidden agenda. Sharīʿa reconciliation endeavors to unite
Sharīʿa with universal human rights through a Muʿtazilī search for objective values.
Yet, doubts in the ever existence of objectivity is likely to abort Sharīʿa’s reconciliation
attempts. In all this, the scientism of Sharīʿa is not arriving at its target of reconciling
Sharīʿa with liberal laws and purposes but rather eliminating its competitive edge to a
hegemonic liberalism.
Keywords: scientism, Sharīʿa reforms, codification, civic reasoning, objective
morality, liberalism.
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Introduction
How to deal with Sharīʿa (Islamic law) in modern polities is a question that surfaces
every time a violent or non-violent showdown occurs between Muslim-majority
governments and Islamist militant/political groups. Islamists around the world have
been advocating a return to Sharīʿa in the post-colonial age (1950s onwards). They
reason that the independence of almost all Muslim-majority countries in the second half
of the 20th century is propitious to the resumption of Islamic legal culture that
colonialism has temporarily interrupted. The return to Sharīʿa, as the Islamist argument
goes, is the first step towards rebuilding the Muslim countries and polities that have
been devastated by years of colonial exploitation and oppression respectively. 1
Muslim-majority governments, however, are finding it hard to deliver. The Sharīʿa
revival proposition is mostly nebulous, costly and controversial.2
The Islamists’ list for advocates of Sharīʿa revival is long and mostly differ over
the degree of militancy needed to realize such cause. There are the Muslim Brotherhood
(MB), the Salafīs, the Wahhābīs, the Qaeda and Taliban to name but a few. The fight
for power between these groups and their governments encourages Sharīʿa reform
advocates to rethink methods for the revival of Sharīʿa law, albeit in a modernized
form.3 It is hoped that the inclusion of a modernized Sharīʿa, or the so-called Sharīʿa
reforms, in the national laws of Muslim countries would sideline Islamist militancy and
insurrections.

Former Egyptian Judge ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAwda finds Islam dīn wa dawlah (religion and state) in the
sense that Islam has to rule all aspects of the Muslim’s life for his/her success on earth and salvation in
the hereafter. Kuwaiti political scientists ʿAbdullah al-Nefeisī, on the other hand, ascertains that the
history of Islam provides precedents for public oversight of the executive actions and law enforcement.
See ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAwda, Al-Islām wa Awdāʿina al-Siyāsiyya 60-80 (Dar al-Risālah, 1981). ʿAbdullah
al-Nefeisī, ʿIndama Yaḥkum al-Islām 47-90 (3rd ed., Maktabat Afāq, 2013).
2
For instance, in 1978, Egyptian parliament passed a resolution forming a special committee to review
proposals to revising the Egyptian Civil Code in accordance with the dictates of Sharīʿa. The
committee delivered drafts of civil and criminal laws. Yet, the draft laws were never passed for
undeclared reasons. Enid Hill, Al-Sanhuri and Islamic Law: The Place and Significance of Islamic Law
in the Life and Work of ʿAbdel Razzaq al-Sanhuri, Egyptian Jurist and Scholar, 1895-1971 [Part II], 3
Arab Law Quarterly 182, 210-1, (1988).
3
Islamic law reforms in the Middle East went through three phases: reforms to withhold the
encroachments of legal capitulations to powerful colonists; reforms to revive the indigenous culture
following independence from colonial powers and finally reforms to meet the demands of an Islamized
society.
1

The proponents of Sharīʿa modernization hold different views over the expected
reforms. Some are sceptic that reforms are currently possible. 4 Others, who are of
particular interest to this thesis, form two opposites and a reconciliatory movement. The
three reform movements are reconfiguring pre-colonial Sharīʿa to suit their reform
purposes. The first movement advocates a total Sharīʿa enforcement through a
codification of its rulings to replace the current positive laws of the Muslim countries.
It aims at providing predictability of Sharīʿa law in accordance with the legal demands
of the modern nation-state. The second movement proposes to oust Sharīʿa from any
legal debate and relegate it to the private sphere. Its goal is to establish a non-religious
justification for legislative decisions. The third is an attempt to found objective values
within Sharīʿa that would reconcile Islam with universal human rights (HRs).

The three reform proposals suggest three aspects of the scientific foundation of
law: predictability, reasoning and objectivity. The question that this thesis tries to
answer is what are the possible effects of legal scientism on the development of Sharīʿa?
Put differently, what happens to Sharīʿa when it becomes a science of law in the way
these movements propose? I am here to argue against the viability of these movements.
They are ineffective in modifying Sharīʿa to agree with a liberalist perception of law as
possessing a democratic standard for decision-making, a non-metaphysical deliberation
for vote-taking and a progressive morality.
The Sharīʿa codification movement introduces predictability as a solution to the
confusing multiplicity of Sharīʿa. However, it does not help mitigate the excessive
authority of Sharīʿa jurists. These legal experts have maintained a firm grip over Sharīʿa
legislation under a protection-of-religion pretext. The Sharīʿa/HRs reconciliatory
movement proposes an ambiguous Muʿtazilī objectivity in Sharīʿa to concur with HRs.
Nevertheless, it refrains from giving any position on how this objectivity can influence
Sharīʿa’s controversial corporeal punishments. The Sharīʿa privatization movement
appeals to secular reasoning in legislative decisions. Muslims are required to refrain
from arguing Islam in their law-establishing deliberations. This condition undermines

4

Wael Hallaq, for instance, is sceptic that the realpolitik of the modern state in the 21st century can
abide by the doctrines of Sharīʿa, especially those related to the total independence of legislation from
state control. Wael B. Hallaq, The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity’s Moral
Predicament 37-73 (Columbia University Press, 2013).

2

Sharīʿa in face of atheism and liberal values, especially that the latter places additional
constitutional limitations to proposing Sharīʿa in the public sphere.

To prove my claim, I am dividing this thesis into four chapters. The first chapter
outlines the ideas of the three reform movements: Sharīʿa codification, privatization
and reconciliation. I focus on the ideas of what I regard as the core reformists of every
movement to give an adequate review of their proposals in the given space. The second
chapter tackles codification’s main concern with predictability. I show that
predictability necessitates the singularity of the state’s law, a matter easy to accomplish
by official jurists. However, who gets to decide the law is still a matter to be resolved
by traditional undemocratic means: the expertise of the jurist and the power of the
caliph. No mention of the laity.
The third chapter deals with the Sharīʿa privatization movement’s suggestion of
civic reasoning (CV). CV imposes on Muslims the moral duty to use secular reasoning
rather than religious in their public deliberations on legal issues. Liberally perceived
constitutionalism, citizenship rights and HRs further delineate law-constituting
deliberations. These secular restrictions make the movement likely to promote
hypocrisy in the public sphere rather than civic solidarity.
The fourth chapter discusses the objectivity thesis of the Sharīʿa reconciliation
movement. The movement leans towards founding natural law in Islam by reviving the
defunct Muʿtazilī school of theology. The school emphasizes reasoning in discovering
objective values that appeal to all humans and religions. Nonetheless, the movement
faces serious challenges, notably, from the dearth of Muʿtazilī works and doubts over
the universality of the HRs in Western thought. I conclude my thesis with an affirmation
that Sharīʿa and liberalism cannot be reconciled. Despite the endeavors to harmonize
both through scientizing Sharīʿa, both Sharīʿa and liberalism maintain irreconcilable
first principles. The hegemony of one over the other or their continuous struggle, as
happened in Turkey/EU relations, is their likely destiny.

I situate my text in an Islamic law studies and borderline Western legal thinking.
The choice is not optional as all the legal thinking of the reform movements are a
Western transplant. In referring to Western thought, I am not conducting a comparative
3

study between Sharīʿa and Western jurisprudence but simply verifying the origins of
the reform movements. My aim is to show that the borrowed reform thoughts lack true
engagement with their foreign sources. These sources, if revisited, have unresolved
problems that may complicate Sharīʿa’s reform proposition when left ignored.

4

I. Sharīʿa Reform Movements
The scientism of Sharīʿa is an attempt to reconfigure Sharīʿa along lines of the Western
science of law. The ultimate aim is to enforce the currently marginalized Sharīʿa in
Muslim-majority countries. The scientism movement, which was never identified as
such, has started in the late 19th century and continues to date. It comprises many subreform movements wishing to show that Sharīʿa could live up to the Western challenge
that law is a science. As Malcolm Kerr rightly comments the Western model has placed
a double-standard imperative on Islamic reforms in the last 200 years: to be no less
advanced than Europe and no less Islamic than the conservative tradition of Islam.5 In
this chapter, I give a brief survey of three scientism of Sharīʿa movements: the
codification, the privatization and the reconciliation. The three movements experiment
with the double-standard imperative to make a modernized Sharīʿa appealing to Muslim
legislators.

A. The Codification of Sharīʿa
Codifying Sharīʿa rulings was first contemplated in Sunnī Islam in the 8th century. Ibn
al-Muqaffaʿ (d. 757), a Muslim author and translator, urged caliph Abū Jaʿfar alManṣūr to unify the ever-multiplying Sharīʿa law across the Muslim lands through
codification. His view was that a Sharīʿa code would recognize a single ruling on every
particular issue and forbid the application of all others. This way, equality before the
law would be possible throughout the Islamic caliphate.6 Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ’s proposal
was never put into practice especially that renowned jurists, such as, Imām Mālik (711795)7 refused the request of caliph Harūn al-Rashīd to codify the Mālikī law as the
recognized law of the caliphate.

Malcolm H. Kerr, Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad ʿAbduh and
Rashid Reda 16 (University of California Press, 1996).
6
Fāṭima Selīm al-ʿAwwa, ʿAqd al-Taḥkīm fī al-Sharīʿa wal-Qānūn: Dirāsa li-Taqnīn al-Fiqh al-Islāmī
wal-Taʾthīr al-Tashrīʿī li-Majalat al-Aḥkām al-ʿAdliyya 46-7 (al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 2002).
7
The Mālikīyya school, one of the extant four schools of law in Sunnī Islam, is named after Imām
Mālik.
5

5

Imām Mālik’s reasoning was that unifying Sharīʿa law would replace the
people’s customary laws with unknown ones in non-Mālikī regions.8 Only in the 19th
century did codification of Sharīʿa come to life. At the hands of the Ottomans, the first
civil law code, known as the Mejelle, was drafted and ratified in 1876. The code
included contracts, sales, evidence and civil law procedure. The Mejelle’s lifespan was
short as it was abolished in 1926 and replaced by a Swiss-patterned civil law code in
Turkey, following the abolishment of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924.9
The codification of Sharīʿa law is an idea that never really died out. ʿAbdel alQādir ʿAwda (1906-1954), former Egyptian judge and MB member, sought the
enforcement of Sharīʿa through a codification of its rulings. This time, however, it was
the codification of Islamic Criminal Law that formed the topic of his Sharīʿa reforms.
His attempt produced a criminal law code known as al-Tashrī’ al-Jināʾī (criminal law
legislation). The code is a compilation of the ḥudūd laws (textually specified crimes
and their punishments). These laws, complains ʿAwda, are mentioned in an
unsystematic way in the various books on Islamic law and jurisprudence. Thus, comes
his task of compiling and rearranging them along lines of Western codification.10
ʿAwda’s code comprises chapters on the famous seven ḥudūd laws of theft,
wine drinking, adultery/fornication, apostacy, slander (a false claim of committing
fornication or adultery), highway robbery and armed rebellion. Qiṣāṣ (jus
talionis/retaliation for homicide and battering) is given a separate section for it does not
fall under ḥudūd. Every chapter commences with the Qurʾānic and the Prophetic text
on the crime. It then defines the crime according to the ordinance of the divine text; it
delineates its conditions and exceptions and finally it states its punishment. From
ʿAwda’s perspective, a codified criminal law of Islam may enhance knowledge of the
law and facilitate its enforcement.11
ʿAwda’s code was never adopted in his home country, Egypt. Since the end of
the 19th century, Egypt has been following consecutive French-patterned criminal law
8

Id. at 48.
Id. at 69-83.
10
ʿAbdel Qadir ʿAwda, Al-Tashrīʿ al-Jināʾī al-Islāmī Muqāranan bil-Qānūn al-Waḍʿī 9-11 (vol.1,
Maktabat Dār al-Turāth, 2005).
11
Id.
9
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codes. The 1937 code, for example, approved the penal concepts of fines, incarcerations
and death by hanging. ʿAwda himself studied these laws in Cairo University and
followed their categorization of crimes according to punishments in codifying Sharīʿa’s
criminal law. Nevertheless, ʿAwda’s code is of great significance as it concretizes the
possibility of enforcing Sharīʿa’s corporeal punishments in a post-colonial context.
Through the code, Sharīʿa’s punishments of flogging, stoning, amputations and
crucifixion made a comeback, at least culturally, in the modern times.

Today, the code is cited in every textbook as the ought to-be norm for MuslimMajority countries. 12 Although countries, such as Saudi Arabia, shied away from
codifying its Sharīʿa-based substantive criminal law,13 countries like the United Arab
Emirates codified the ḥudūd alongside a positive criminal law. The Emirati Criminal
Law is thus divided into codified positive law crimes and punishments and uncodified
ḥudūd. 14 A person committing a ḥudūd crime, such as, adultery would receive a
Sharīʿa-based corporeal punishment, while a person committing a non-ḥudūd crime,
such as, libel would be fined or incarcerated. In Shīʿī Islam, Iran has already introduced
the ḥudūd in its Criminal Law Code of 1991. The code classifies crimes along lines of
Sharīʿa’s corporeal punishments of ḥudūd (death, flogging and crucifixion) and nonḥudūd crimes, known as taʿzīrāt (flogging). The penalties, however, are not strictly
observed. Stoning for adultery, for example, is replaced by a death penalty or a prison
term and taʿzīrāt by incarceration and fines.

B. The Privatization of Sharīʿa
Restricting Sharīʿa to the private sphere is a concept that developed in many Muslimmajority countries around the time of abolishing the Ottoman empire in 1924.
Secularists in Muslim countries introduced nationalism to fill the identity gap that the
Ottoman fall had left behind. Kemalism in Turkey, Nasserism in Egypt and Baathism
in Syria and Iraq were all nationalist movements that based their laws on secular

Muḥammad ʿAlī Maḥgūb, Al-Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī wa Naẓariyyātuhu al-ʿAmma al-Jināʾiyya walMadaniyya fi al-Sharīʿa wal-Qānūn 212 (Akadimiyyat al-Shurṭa, no given date).
13
Only Saudi Procedural Criminal Law is codified.
14
Butti Al-Muhairi, The Islamisation of Laws in the UAE: The Case of the Penal Code, 11 Arab Law
Quarterly 350, 350-1 (1996).
12
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arguments away from the precepts of Sharīʿa. Yet, the separation of church and state
that gave rise to the relegation of religion to the private sphere in secular Europe was
never contemplated in Islam. Islam does not have a church nor an ecclesiastical order
to conduct the retreat. It is, as many Islamist reformists claim, a religion and a system
of government. It comprises rulings on ʿibādāt (rituals) and muʿāmalāt
(transactions/dealings). None of them may be followed separately.15

Secular Muslims were, according to the Islamist claim, oblivious of the
temporal/spiritual union in Islam because colonialism has made them erroneously
believe that Islam has no role to play in their public life.16 Islamist arguments of this
type have sparked a forceful return to Sharīʿa, albeit in different degrees. In 1980, Egypt
amended its 1971 Constitution to recognize the principles of Sharīʿa as “the” main
source of law. Saudi Arabia applied more conservative laws following the 1979
occupation of Mecca’s holy shrine, al-Kaʿba. Iran enforced a ḥudūd law after the
success of the Iranian revolution in ousting the secular rule of the Shah in 1979.
No matter the counter arguments, the privatization of Sharīʿa or its ousting from
the public realm is a reform leitmotif. ʿAbdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im (1946-), professor
of Islamic law in the US, has been for decades promoting the ideas of his late professor
Maḥmūd Muḥammad Ṭaha (1909-1985), a Sudanese religious thinker and politician,
executed in 1985. Ṭaha contends that Sharīʿa’s reform ought to be conducted by
following the early Meccan verses of the Qurʾān rather than the late Medinan ones. The
Meccan verses, observes Ṭaha, focus on the spiritual relationship between man and
God, while the Medinan on human interaction and transaction. By grounding Sharīʿa
reforms in the Meccan spirituality rather than the Medinan legality, Sharīʿa is not the
law of the Muslim countries but a source of moral guidance to their societies and
governments alike.17

ʿAwda, supra note 1, at 60-4.
Blaming the marginalization of Sharīʿa on colonialism is a recurring theme in many Islamist
writings, whether of Sunnī or Shīʿī orientation. For the Shīʿī blame discourse, see Imām Khomeini,
Islamic Government 7-10 (trans. Hamid Algar, The Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imām
Khomeini’s Works, no given date). For the Sunnī, see also Muḥmūd Muḥammad Ṭaha, Taṭwīr Sharīʿat
al-Aḥwāl al-Shakhṣiyya 7-9 (3rd ed., no given publisher, 1979).
17
ʿAbdullahi An-Na’im, Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and
International Law 52-68 (The American University in Cairo Press, 1990).
15
16
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Ṭaha calls the Meccan verses ayāt al-uṣūl (the founding verses) and the
Medinan ayāt al-furūʿ or al-wiṣāya (the ancillary or guardianship verses). Following
the Meccan not the Medinan, the legislator may avert the controversial Sharīʿa laws on
gender inequality, such as those on marriage, divorce and inheritance and the relegation
of religious minorities to the level of second-class citizens. Instead, she may adopt more
dignified and equality-based laws, while still subscribing to Sharīʿa principles.18
Later in his research, An-Na’im furthers the distance between Sharīʿa and
legislation by advocating CV, 19 a term that refers to a rationale in legal reasoning
common among all citizens of a given Muslim state. An-Na’im maintains that citizens
wishing to enforce any Sharīʿa law must argue the validity of that law through a
common reasoning acceptable to all fellow citizens, Muslims and non-Muslims alike.
Otherwise, the adoption of Sharīʿa morality, without sound reasoning and acceptance,
would jeopardize An-Na’im’s argument for state neutrality.20 This is because the state
in adopting a Sharīʿa-based legal argument would be siding with Islam, while
neglecting other religions.
In a CV sense, the morality of Sharīʿa must be rationalized or rather secularized
to become part of state legislation. An-Na’im does not explain how he reconciles this
later view with his early advocacy of Ṭaha’s Meccan verses. Although Ṭaha eliminates
the Medinan law of subordination, such as those of half inheritance for women and
obedience-for-maintenance in marriage, he still affirms the use of a Meccan Islambased argument to sanction gender equality laws and their like in Muslim-majority
countries.21 This contradiction is soon explained away once we think that An-Na’im’s
proposition for the secular rationalization of Sharīʿa arguments to make them appeal to
the dictates of CV will have to be carried through Ṭaha’s Meccan method of interpreting
Islamic principles and laws.22

Ṭaha, supra note 16, at 53.
ʿAbdullahi An-Na’im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Sharīʿa 7 (Harvard
University Press, 2008).
20
An-Na’im’s position on state neutrality is to too brief to give a clear thesis on the issue. What he
appears to be advocating is the separation of the state powers from a particular partisan politics. Id. at
6-8.
21
Ṭaha, supra note 16 at 55-8.
22
Badredine Arfi, Pluralism to-come and the Debates on Islam and Secularism, 49 Philosophy and
Social Criticism 655, 656 (2015).
18
19

9

C. The Reconciliation of Sharīʿa with HRs
Like positivism, Sharīʿa is a pedigree law.23 To certify a law as Islamic, the law must
be directly or indirectly derived from or confirm with a set of rules entrenched in a
compendium, known in Sharīʿa as al-naṣṣ (the text). The Text here is that of the
revealed word of God, the Qurʾān, and the sayings and actions of Prophet Muḥammad,
the Ḥadīth or Sunna. And like positivism, Islam would only accept justice in the
absolute insofar as it does not offend a repugnancy clause. Thus, any justice principle,
like equal treatment before the law, has to run through the filter of Sharīʿa standards
before being sanctioned as state law.

This textual testing has driven many Muslim intellectuals to come up with
different methods to align Islam with HRs’ principles. Ṭaha’s abovementioned
employment of Meccan verses is one of these methods. Other reformists have attempted
a direct reading of the Text or an interpretation of a particular Qurʾānic verse. Founding
HRs in Islam through the use of the Medina Charter is an example of the first. Prophet
Muḥammad drafted the Charter in 622 following his migration to Medina. It recognizes
protection rights for all the tribal inhabitants of the Medina, regardless of their religion,
by endorsing an alliance among them. Today, the Charter is taken as the basis for a
constitutional government in Islam. The government is constitutional in that it provides
equal citizenship rights to inhabitants of different religious affiliations living within its
jurisdiction.24

Of the second method, i.e., expounding the meaning of a certain verse, the
reading of verse 3:104 on “enjoining the good and forbidding the bad” is of
incomparable fame. The verse is often coupled with the Ḥadīth that orders a Muslim to
change any wrong she encounters “with her hand, her tongue or her heart.” To date,
both texts legitimate the right to fight a jihadi war against misguided Muslims and nonMuslims, to speak truth to power and, legally, to file al-ḥisba lawsuit. Al-Ḥisba permits
any plaintiff, without capacity or interest, to bring an action in court against a person,
23

For the Pedigree Thesis in positivism, see Kenneth Einar Himma, Inclusive Legal Positivism in The
Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence & Philosophy of Law 128 (eds. Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro,
Oxford University Press, 2002).
24
For the Charter and its HRs’ implications in Islam, see Walid Nuwayhid, The Medina Charter in
Human Rights in Arab Thought: A Reader 229-49 (ed. Salma K. Jayyusi, I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2011).
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whom she finds wronging a generic other (the public or a third party). 25 Al-ḥisba
defenders find it legitimating the fight against any injustices and not necessarily an antiIslamic behavior.
From among the Sharīʿa/HRs reconciliation attempts, the revival of
Muʿtazilism is a forcefully suggested method. ʿAbdulaziz Sachedina (1942-), professor
of Islamic Studies in the US promotes this reconciliation through the restoration of the
Muʿtazilī doctrines that were once prominent in the 9th century Islam. Muʿtazilism
posits the value of an action in the action itself and not in its surroundings. A good deed,
for example, stems from the nature of the deed and not from its subjective evaluation
by its agent. It is thus possible to have an objective evaluation of actions, perceived by
the human mind without religious instructions. The point that the Muʿtazilīs try to make
through the objective evaluation of actions is to prove that man does not need revelation
(the religious text) to distinguish the good from the bad.26 The human mind, from a
Muʿtazilī standpoint, is capable of perceiving that murder is a heinous crime as much
as it is capable of learning the same value from the revelatory ordinance “thou shalt not
kill.”27

Sachedina uses Muʿtazilī thought to demonstrate that Islam is prone to adopting
universal ethics that are in concordance with non-Muslim perception of HRs.28 His
assumption is that since values are intrinsic to action, then contemporary Muslims may
adopt international HRs laws without having qualms about flouting Muslim ethics. This
proposition is not new to Islamic reform attempts. A century ago, the renowned Islamic
scholar, former Muftī of Egypt Muḥammad ʿAbdou (1849-1905) advocated Muʿtazilī
theology to enhance the role of reason in founding Sharīʿa-compliant laws and ethics.

Maḥmūd Yūnus, Ruʾya Jadīda ḥawla Dawr al-Niyāba al-ʿAmma fi Masāʾil al-Murāfaʿāt alMadaniyya wal-Aḥwāl al-Shakhṣiyya 13-18 (Dār al-Nahḍa al-ʿArabiyya, 2005). A banal example of alḥisba case is the claim that an Islamist lawyer brought to court in 1995 against Muslim intellectual Hamid
Nasr Abou Zayd to divorce the latter from his wife. The lawyer accused Abou Zayed of apostacy from
Islam due to his controversial writings on the interpretation of the Qurʾān. The lawyer founded his claim
on Egypt’s Sharīʿa-based Personal Status law which forbids the marriage of a Muslim woman to a nonMuslim.
26
ʿAbdulaziz Sachedina, Islam and the Challenge of Human Rights 60-1 (Oxford University Press,
2009).
27
Verse 17:33 in the Qurʾān bears the same prohibition. “Do not kill the soul which God had made
sacred except in the course of justice.”
28
Supra note 26, at 78-80.
25
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In his Risālat al-Tawḥīd (Treaties on the Oneness of God), ʿAbdou argues that any
mind is capable of perceiving the beauty of flowers.29
The simplicity of ʿAbdou’s example is perhaps intended to show that there are
commonalities that all people may agree on, regardless of the degree of their
intelligence and expertise. An important teleological difference, however, holds
between Sachedina’s proposition and that of ʿAbdou. ʿAbdou adopts Muʿtazilī thinking
to escape the restriction of founding laws based on the Islamic text. Sachedina uses the
Muʿtazilīs’ historical argument on objective values to assure Muslims that they would
experience historical continuum with their traditions when they adopt HRs values. For
ʿAbdou’s purposes, objective values ought to be followed because they can produce
Islamic laws as much as the text. For Sachedina, objective values are not new to Islam.

29

Muḥammad ʿAbdou, Risālat al-Tawḥīd 67 (ed. Muḥammad ʿImāra, Dār al-Shurūq, 1994).
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II. Predictability and the Monopoly of Sharīʿa Legislation
Predictability in the sense of postulating the law’s position on a future act and knowing
the reasons for it is one of Max Weber’s criteria for a rational law.30 A law lacking
predictability, coupled with a legislation drawn from prophetic or revelatory decisions,
is in a Weberian sense a formally irrational law. The contrast between the irrational and
the rational law does not negate their legal nature but explains their contributions to
their respective societies. A rational law, argues Weber, has contributed to the rise of
capitalism in Europe but an irrational one has not.31
As 19th century Ottomans were set on joining the capitalist world system,
codification was their way to rationalize their Sharīʿa-based law in a Weberian logic.32
They introduced the Ottoman Penal Code and the Land Code of 1858, the Civil Code
(the Mejelle) of 1876 and the Commercial Code of 1906. Yet, Weber dismissed
Ottoman codification as an untrue act of rationalizing the law; a law based on religious
precepts in the administration of justice defies his putative rationality standard.33

A. The Importance of Predictability to Sharīʿa Enforcement
Weber’s objection, however, misses the importance of Ottoman codes in solving or
rather exposing Sharīʿa ’s particular problem. Sharīʿa is a 1400-year old tradition.
Throughout that period, it has witnessed divisions, revisions and development of its
doctrines, principles and underlining theological beliefs. These divisions produced
different legal rulings that eventually grouped into madhāhib (schools of law) within
every denomination.34
The multitude of these schools’ rulings creates confusion for modern Muslim
laymen and legal professionals alike. Which ruling is the authentic Islamic position is a
30

David M. Trubek, Weber on Law and Capitalism, 1972 WIS. L. REV. 721, 729 (1972).
See Id. 729-31.
32
Avi Rubin, Modernity as a Code: The Ottoman Empire and the Global Movement of Codification, 59
Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient 828, 843 (2016).
33
Id. at 842.
34
For a concise history of the schools in the Sunnī denomination, see Aḥmād Taymūr Pasha, Naẓra
Tarīkhiyya fi Ḥudūth al-Madhāhib al-Fiqhiyya al-Arbaʿa 50-84 (ed. Muḥammad Abū Zahra, Dār alQādrī, 1990).
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question that is difficult to answer. Although many schools died out in a kind of
historical natural selection within Sharīʿa,35 the schools’ pool is still too big to manage.
The Sunnī denomination alone has a final four: the Ḥanafī, the Mālikī, the Shāfiʿī and
the Ḥanbalī. The last two centuries added the Ṣūfī, the Wahhābī and the Salafī.
Meanwhile, the Shīʿī denomination has the Jaʿfarī, the Durzī, the Ismāʿīlī and the
Yazīdī.

Sunnī jurist Diyāʾ al-Dīn al-Juwaynī (1028-1085) demonstrates the possible
conflict among Sharīʿa rulings due to the differences among the schools of law. In a
hypothetical divorce case, a Shafiʿī husband divorces36 his Ḥanafī wife in a moment of
anger. The Shafiʿī school does not recognize an unintentional divorce, while the Ḥanafi
school does. Accordingly, the husband considers himself married and the wife
divorced.37 Since both schools have valid interpretations of what constitutes Sharīʿa
law, the solution to this problem is dependent on the discretion of the judge or rather
her school. The agreed upon principle is that ḥukm al-Qāḍī yarfaʿ ul-khilāf (the rule of
the judge ends the dispute).

Yet, the judge’s power to end the dispute is originally derived from her
officialdom rather than any legal justification. Sunnī jurist ʿAbdul Raḥmān Shaykhzāde
(d. 1667), for example, agrees that a qādī (judge) should uphold the decision of an
arbitrator if the decision agrees with that of the qādī’s school and reverse it, if not.
However, the qadī’s decision is not to be reversed by any other qādī for she has the
wilāya ʿamma (official authority), that the arbitrator obviously lacks.38 Article 1849 of
the Mejelle, conditions this resolve by stating that the decision of the state-appointed
qādī is sustained insofar as it does not conflict with the ruling of an uṣūl (sources of
Sharīʿa law). Ali Ḥaydar, an Ottoman jurist/exponent of the Mejelle, limits these sources
to the first three: the Qurʾān, the Ḥadith and the consensus of the Muslim nation.39

The Jarīrī and the Ẓāhirī schools are two of the defunct schools of the Sunnī denomination.
Sharīʿa recognizes the husband’s exclusive right to the repudiation of the marriage contract.
37
Diyāʾ al-Dīn al-Juwaynī, Kitāb al-Ijtihād min Kitāb al-Talkhīs li-Imām al-Ḥaramayn 36 (Dār alʿUlūm wal Thaqāfa, 1987).
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ʿAbdul Raḥmān Shaykhzāde, Majmaʿ al-Anhur fi Sharḥ Multaqa al-Abḥur 241-2 (ed. Khalīl alManṣūr, Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1998).
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For the Article and its exposition, see ʿAlī Ḥaydar, Durar al-Ḥukkām Sharḥ Majallat al-Aḥkām
4:702-3 (4 vols., trans. Fahmī Ḥusnī, Dār ʿĀlam al-Kutub, 2003).
35
36

14

Predictability is even more important to the modern enforcement of Islamic
criminal law. To maintain the modern constitutional principle of legality (no crime and
no punishment without law), criminal law must be known through official dissemination
before the commission of the crime, to which the law will be applied. ʿAwda’s
compilation of Islamic Criminal Law in an organized codex does the first step to
legality. It ensures that the officially recognized crimes and punishments of Sharīʿa are
known to laymen and lawyers once the criminal code is promulgated. Neither judge nor
layman will have to consult the endless hornbooks of Sharīʿa schools of law trying to
identify the Islamic position on a certain criminal action. 40 The code will answer
intricate and consequential questions to ensure legality. The status of al-moḥṣan (the
married culprit) in a zinā (fornication/adultery) crime,41 for example, would have to be
settled in the code.
In realizing criminal law predictability, singularizing Sharīʿa law is an
imperative. Every crime must have a single definition and punishment. Singularity is
thus a means to predictability in Sharīʿa but also a step to end its pluralism. Sharīʿa
codification trumps so many alternative rulings to singularize the law. ʿAwda, for
instance, drafts his code with the aim of having a single ruling for every crime. The
controversial issue of the qādī deciding according to her eyewitness knowledge of a
crime is a case among many that undergo ʿAwda’s singularization surgery. ʿAwda takes
sides with the common juristic opinion that a qādī should not adjudicate a case based
on her special eyewitness knowledge. ʿAwda’s choice, however, neglects the opinions
of some Shafiʿīs and Ẓahirīs, who rule otherwise. Their logic is that the qādī’s
knowledge of the truth concerning the events of a case is the whole purpose of
presenting evidence in court. If that knowledge is attained with certainty by other means,
then she should act accordingly.42

40

Supra note 10, at 1:9-10.
In zinā, Sharīʿa jurists distinguish between the punishment of a married and a non-married culprit in
terms of the due punishment. The former receives a death by stoning penalty, while the latter a number
of lashes depending on her status as a free person or slave. The underlying reason for the distinction is
the availability of a lawful sexual outlet for the married and none for the unmarried. The questionable
case is the punishment for the previously married at the time of committing the zinā crime. The
previously married may receive the married culprit’s punishment of death by stoning or the flogging
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school of law in Sharīʿa.
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B. Who Decides the Law?

Now, the pressing question is: who gets to decide which rule to follow in the process of
singularizing Sharīʿa law? Three individuals come to mind: the Sharīʿa scholar
(sheikh/faqīh/ʿālim), the caliph or the public representative. Sharīʿa jurists already
exclude the public from legislative decision-making. Their view of the public is
deprecating. Both Sunnī and Shīʿī jurists regard the lay Muslim believer a total muqallid
(follower of jurists). They require her to follow juristic decisions on any Islam-related
matter to absolve herself of blame for any wrongdoing. 43 Shūra, (consultation)
mentioned in the Qurʾān, 44 is often argued as an Islamic doctrine to ensure public
consultation on policy making decisions. Tentative reform proposals have been trying
to extend shūra’s scope of practice to make it legislatively binding. However, the
marginalization of Sharīʿa in the post-colonial era has discouraged shūra’s
development. Hence, the classical view of the passive laity still stands.

With the public excluded, we are left with jurist and caliph. The jurist has the
Sharīʿa knowledge to produce a Sharīʿa-compliant legislation and the caliph has the
essential power to enforce that legislation. Muslim sociologist Abū Zayd Ibn Khaldūn
(1332-1406) calls caliphal might al-ʿasabiyya (tribal solidarity).

45

Al-ʿasabiyya

empowers kings to meet the demands of sovereignty, which in Ibn Khaldūn’s view,
boils down to making unchallenged decisions and executing them.
Sharīʿa-based legislation is thus a jurist-caliph enterprise. The Mejelle drafting
committee, for instance, was comprised of four officials from the Ottoman ministry of
justice and two from the state advisory committee. 46 All knowledgeable in Sharīʿa.
Article 1801 of the Mejelle recognizes their decisions as the uncontestable rulings of
the sultan. Ottoman judges are forbidden from executing other juristic interpretations.
Yet, it is this very need for a jurist-caliph cooperation that reproduces the expert-power
monopoly over Sharīʿa legislation.
For the Sunnī view of the Muslim laity, see Shah Walliullāh al-Dahlawī, ʿIqd al-Jīd fī al-Ijtihād walTaqlīd 72-4 (ed. Muḥammad al-Atharī, Dār al-Fatḥ, 1995). For the Shīʿī position, see Robert Gleave,
Conceptions of Authority in Iraqi Shiʿism: Baqir al-Hakim, Ha’iri and Sistani on Ijtihad, Taqlid and
Marjaʿiyya, 24 Theory, Culture & Society 59, 66 (2007).
44
Verse 42:38.
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Ibn Khaldūn, Muqaddimma 187-8 (Dār al-Qalam, 1989).
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Historically, political leadership and juridical expertise were inseparable and
thus necessitated no expert-ruler cooperation. As Michel Foucault argues, power and
knowledge were united in the character of the ruler. The ruler had to have might and
exceptional knowledge in order to claim rightful leadership. Foucault cites on this
matter the character of the king in Sophocles’ Greek drama Oedipus Rex. Oedipus the
king claims leadership rights over his city by virtue of solving the riddle of the Sphinx
at the gates of that city. Otherwise, the citizens of the city would have been dead.
Oedipus’ knowledge saves the city and thereby earns him kingship rights.47 Individuals
witnessing Oedipus’ background, however, empower the public in speaking truth to
power. They tell Oedipus how he killed the former king, his father. Their narration gives
rise to a history told through the juridical form (witnesses, defendants and judges).48

In Islamic history, power and knowledge were likewise inseparable. The rightful
caliph in any Muslim denomination is the one who has the proper Sharīʿa knowledge
that would secure the protection of Muslims on earth and their salvation in the hereafter.
The most revered caliphs in the Sunnī denomination, known as the rightly guided
caliphs,49 earned leadership rights for being the companions of Prophet Muḥammad.
Their companionship status made them the most knowing of Sharīʿa rulings. Their
narrations of the Prophet’s sayings and doings authenticate what came to be known in
the 9th century as the science of Ḥadīth.50 The companions were thus perceived the most
eligible to succeed the Prophet in the leadership of Muslims.

The unity of knowledge and power is even more stressed for the current Shīʿī
denomination; the imām (the rightful leader) for the Shīʿīs has to be endowed with
divine knowledge of Sharīʿa. From a Shīʿī perspective, only a male offspring of the
Prophet from his daughter Fāṭima possesses this knowledge as he inherits the Prophet’s
infallibility. The imām is further identified from among his family members by

47

Michel Foucault, Truth and Judicial Forms in Power 29 (ed. James D. Faubion ed., trans. Robert
Hurley and others, vol.3, Editions Gallimard, 2000).
48
Id. at 33.
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These are the Companions of the Prophet and the first four caliphs in Sunnī Islam. They are in due
order: Abū Bakr, ʿUmar, ʿOthmān and ʿAlī.
50
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followers. The absence of a Companion’s name in the chain of narration weakens its authenticity.
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designation, an act in which the current imām identifies the rightful heir to his infallible
knowledge.51
The last of the rightly guided caliphs Alī b. Abī Ṭālib died in 661. The last of
the Shīʿī imāms, al-Mahdī, is said to have been concealed from mankind (occultation)
in 941. Around these dates, knowledge and power depart in Islam. Later Muslim
generations were deemed incapable of delivering the man with either the eccentric
qualities of the imām or the fortunate circumstance of the Prophet’s companionship.
Knowledge had to be established by other means. The knowledge intended here differs,
however, from Foucault’s beginning of history theory. It is not the juridical truth
concerning events, learned through the testimonies of witnesses from the public.52

Rather, it is the knowledge of the divine law that is sought after. The public was
not speaking truth to power, as Foucault argues in the rise of Greek democracy, but the
Muslim jurists speaking divine law to power. Already in the 7th and 8th centuries, the
Sunnīs had compiled the Qurʾān and the Sunna, while the Shīʿīs codified their Ḥadīths
around the 11th century. These texts required and delivered experts on different fields of
Sharīʿa: Uṣūl (sources of law), Tafsīr (Qurʾānic exegesis) and Ḥadīth (Prophetic
sayings). The expertise for these so-called sciences is different from the simple policy
planning of lay politicians.

The divine codices, the first codification in Islam, place divine law in a
somewhat ultra-legislative position in an Islamic polity. They set three juristically
interpreted limits on positive law legislation, i.e., laws of non-divine origin. First, the
post-divine codices of caliphs/states/legislatures must apply the textual Sharīʿa laws to
gain the legitimacy of Islamic rule. Indeed, the reason for the investiture of a caliph is
to uphold Sharīʿa. Sunnī jurist Abū al-Ḥasan al-Māwardī (972-1058), in his renowned
work al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyya (The Ordinances of Government), ascertains the necessity
of instating a caliph to apply Sharīʿa. This is because Muslims are not expected to
voluntarily comply to Sharīʿa law and that would lead to fawḍa (anarchy).53 Second,

Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi’ism 11-22
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any enacted positive law is conditioned on the repugnancy clause of not violating a clear
textual ordinance. The clause puts caliphal positive laws in a position of uncertainty;
the laws always run the risk of amendments or total abrogation. Third, the caliph cannot
alter the codices in wording. Yet, she can negotiate with Sharīʿa jurists over their
hermeneutics.

The separation of knowledge and power has politically empowered jurists. Noah
Feldman asserts that Islam had witnessed a balance of power exhibited in the separate
functions of the caliph and the jurist. The caliph held the administrative authority to
appoint the judges and enforce their judgments. But the jurists expatiated the laws
applied in Muslim courts.54 Feldman cites al-Māwardī for historical proof to his Islamic
constitutionalism claim. Al-Māwardī approved the de-facto governorship of the
powerful princes of the Buyid dynasty (r. 934-1062)55 insofar as they recognized the
ʿAbbāsid caliph as the ultimate ruler and enforced Sharīʿa in their usurped regions. AlMāwardī’s decision is criticized for reducing the caliphate to a papacy, i.e., a spiritual
and powerless leadership. Feldman, however, insists on the effectiveness of his example
on grounds that al-Māwardī was preserving Sharīʿa.56
How divine law speaks to power in Feldman’s example is not clear to me.
Nevertheless, the example is telling in other ways. As will be seen, the scientism of
Sharīʿa in the sense of creating a self-contained legal knowledge insulated from the
personal whims/interests of politicians had started long before the European age of
Enlightenment. Muslim jurists since al-Māwardī’s time have identified five necessities
that Muslims ought to preserve for the betterment of their lives and their eschatological
salvation. These in due order are religion, life, mind, progeny and property. 57 The
protection of religion (PR) is what concerns us here. In mapping PR’s boundaries, the
abovementioned jurist al-Juwaynī, inter alia, restricts PR to Islam, finds it the caliph’s
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first duty, approves killing infidels and apostates for PR violation and preaches
situational quietism or revolution against an unjust caliph.58

On quietism and revolution, al-Juwaynī elaborates that it is the duty of a Muslim
to revolt against an unjust caliph, presumably a non-Sharīʿa compliant one. Yet, if this
revolt would lead to more corruption (fasādun akbar), like a civil war or the loss of
Islamic rule, then quietism is preferable.59 With PR in mind, the acquiescence of the
Sunnī jurist al-Māwardī to the rule of the Shīʿī Buyids is comprehensible. The
preservation of Sharīʿa is the first duty of a Muslim jurist. If the Buyid governors enforce
Sharīʿa, and the caliph is too weak to remove them from office, then quietism is the
right law. PR also explains the jurists’ historical change of hearts; at times they stand
by the victimized Shīʿīs and at another the unjust Sunnī caliphs.60

C. The Scientism of Sunnī Sharīʿa: Old and New
The scientism of Sharīʿa in Sunnī Islam originated with debates over the rightful imām
(leader) in Islam. While the Shīʿīs believe in the leadership of the infallible descendants
of the Prophet, the Sunnīs uphold the rulership of a fallible Muslim, provided she meets
certain leadership qualifications. 61 Among these qualifications is her knowledge of
Sharīʿa to the level of ijtihād (finding the law through the direct study of its textual
sources of the Qurʾān and the Sunna).62 Ijtihād is the highest degree of Sharīʿa studies
that any jurist can attain. A scholar reaching the ijtihād level is known as a mujtahid.
Lower rank scholars and laymen follow his decisions compared to those of a muqallid
(a follower of other scholars’ determinations).63

Thus, Muslim jurists, by requiring the ruler to be a mujtahid, have somewhat
secured themselves the post of her legal advisor. A number of reasons substantiates this
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claim. Obtaining the status of a mujtahid is totally dependent on the generous
recognition of fellow jurists, and that has not been granted to anyone since almost the
16th century. By that time, the standard for meriting a juristic scholarship the rank of
ijtihād has dismayingly burgeoned. Additionally, the highest rank of a mujtahid muṭlaq
(absolute mujtahid) has been preserved for the scholars whose names are given to the
abovementioned four schools of law.64 The last scholar to be an eponym of a relatively
surviving school, Ibn Ḥanbal, died in 855 (3rd century Islam).

Ranks next in line to the absolute mujtahid include: the school-affiliated absolute
mujtahid, the mujtahid within the school and the learned within the school. As their
titles show, lower-rank mujtahids have to be affiliated to a certain school.65 This new
condition made it even harder for any jurist to reach an ijtihād rank than it was for the
absolute mujtahid; whereas the absolute mujtahid had only to study the textual sources
of Sharīʿa, the lower-rank mujtahids had to be learned in the rulings of their school in
addition to the textual sources. The Andalusian jurist of the defunct Ẓāhirī school Abū
Muḥammad Ibn Ḥazm (994-1064) unsuccessfully tried to liberate ijtihād from school
affiliation. 66 By the end of the ʿAbbāsid rule (750-1517), ijtihād rank died out
altogether, entrusting muqallids with Sharīʿa.67
The ending of Sunnī ijtihād is known today as the closing of the door of ijtihād.
The closure meant that a high-rank muqallid jurist must follow the mujtahid’s legal
methods in deciding on any Sharīʿa-related issue, while a low-rank muqallid must only
copy the mujtahid’s ruling on a similar issue. In modern terms, the first would use the
mujtahid’s set standards to reach a decision and the second would use her final
decisions. Many reformists see the closure as the reason for the marginalization of
Sharīʿa in the colonial and post-colonial age. However, modern Sharīʿa scholar
Muḥammad Abū Zahra defends it in a revealing rationalization. Sharīʿa jurists, claims
Abū Zahra, deliberately closed the door of ijtihād without any Sharīʿa precedent to

For example, the Mālikī school is named after the abovementioned Mālik b. Anas (711-795).
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protect Sharīʿa from the whimsical rule of despotic kings.68 In this sense, divine law is
immune from political interventionism and its guardians are the jurists.
The 19th century Sharīʿa codification movement was a continuation of Sharīʿa
scientism. This time, the preservation of Sharīʿa was not in the face of an intervening
local power but an encroaching European colonialism. The 19th century was the height
of European domination over Muslim lands. The weak Ottoman empire was forced to
grant extra-territorial rights (capitulations) to foreign nationals wishing to trade in
Ottoman lands. While residing in the empire, the foreigners and their dragomans
enjoyed the legal privilege of being subject to their national laws and courts. No taxes
were imposed on them without their prior consent and tariffs on their imported goods
were reduced to the bare minimum.69 The Ottomans deemed capitulation a violation of
their sovereignty and a means to empty their coffers to keep them outside Europe.70
To replace capitulatory laws, the codification of Sharīʿa-based Ottoman law
attempted to modernize the empire’s law. It was part of the overall Ottoman Tanzimat
(reforms), that the 19th century superpowers forced on the Ottomans. The apparent
purpose of the codes’ drafters was the preservation of Sharīʿa as a symbol of Islam and
the raison d’etre of the Ottoman empire. Although Ottoman codification failed to end
capitulation, it planted the idea of making Sharīʿa more accessible to a modernizing
legal system.71

D. Velayat-e-Faqih: The Union of Power and Knowledge
While Medieval Sunnism has struggled to shield divine law from political
transgressions, modern Shiʿism is the most successful in that domain. Velayat-e-faqih
(VF) (the viceregency of the jurist), entrenched in Article 5 of the Iranian constitution,
is the doctrine that unifies power and knowledge, as in the early years of Islam. It gives
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the jurists of the Twelver Shīʿīs (TS)72 the right to abolish any state law repugnant to
Shīʿī Sharīʿa. Ayatollah Khomeini (1902-1989), the leader of the 1979 Islamic
revolution in Iran, developed VF and its constitutional institution.
TS’s belief in the exclusive leadership of the infallible imām facilitated the
development of VF. For TS, the imām is a male descendant of Prophet Muḥammad from
his daughter Fāṭima and his cousin ʿAlī.73 All TS are required to know the imām of their
times and acknowledge his leadership to attain salvation in the hereafter. This
knowledge is accomplished by designation; the current imām names his successor,
usually his son. Historically, however, the imamate went into several crises due to the
death of the imām without naming a successor.74
More importantly, the followers of the deceased imām refused to recognize his
death. They believed him alive and will return to eliminate evil and establish justice. All
Shīʿīs call the returning imām al-Mahdī (the guided) or al-Qāʾim (the standing). 75
Although TS call several imāms al-Mahdī, the title is often associated with the 12th imām
Ibn Ḥasan. Ibn Ḥasan, whose existence is doubtful, experienced two ghayba/s
(occultations) a minor in 874 and a major in 941. Early contact with al-Mahdī was
through his sufarāʾ (ambassadors) but that ended with an alleged decree from Ibn Ḥasan
before his grand occultation.76
The imām’s return to disseminate justice on earth gave reason to develop the
doctrine of intiẓār (waiting). Since the return is expected sometime in the far future, it
is the duty of Shīʿī believers to wait patiently for him. Throughout history, intiẓār
sentiment has become a source of Shīʿī passivism and revolution. It grounds the
rejection of upholding Sharīʿa in al-Mahdī’s absence. Leading the communion of Friday
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prayers and the calling for jihād are the imām’s prerogatives.77 They are doubted as
unlawful performances in his absence.
However, Iranian leftist sociologist ʿAlī Sharīʿatī (1933-1977) interprets intiẓār
to be a thesis between two antitheses: truth and reality. The truth is that Shīʿism
safeguards man’s salvation, but the reality is that the Shīʿīs’ political and economic
conditions are not conducive to redemption. Sharīʿatī suggests adopting an active view
of the passive intiẓār to overcome the downside of its reality. He urges Shīʿīs to reiterate
their historical “no” to Sunnī imperialism against their modern-day oppressor, Iran’s
Shah. This way, defends Sharīʿatī, the collective agency of the Shīʿīs would realize the
promise of salvation in their destined future.78
The occultation served well the development of VF. It justified Shīʿī jurists’
claims to authority. They argued that Shīʿīs must be governed by Sharīʿa at all times. In
the absence of the rightful governor (al-Mahdī), a person who is just and knowledgeable
of Shīʿī laws and doctrines must lead the Shīʿī community.79 VF was first suggested and
practiced as a wilāya khaṣa (limited agency) of al-Mahdī. The jurist would lead Friday
prayers and collect the khums (special alms for the needy and the Prophet’s
descendants). Khomeini, however, expanded the jurist’s deputyship to a wilāya ʿamma
(full agency).80 A Shīʿī jurist who is just and knowledgeable of Sharīʿa is qualified to
this position.
TS insist that the jurist holding VF does not share in the imām’s perfectionism.
Nevertheless, the leading jurist in Shīʿism enjoys authority and mystic reverence,
unusual to Sunnism. Primarily, he is designated as marjiʿ al-taqlīd (the emulated). This
is a top ijtihādi rank in Shīʿism. It entails the authority of its holder to issue legal
responsa (fatāwa) and religious decrees.81 The marjiʿ acts as an intermediary between
the imām and the Shīʿī believer. The believer is ordered to follow the mujtahid on all
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ritual and temporal issues and refrain from any direct contact with the imām.82 Afshin
Shahi considers the marjiʿiyyat (source of emulation) and the velāyat (the deputyship)
the two components of the VF. The former expresses the jurist’s exceptional knowledge
and the latter his power. 83 United, power is subserviant to divine law. Scientism is
superfluous.
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III. Reasoning: An infinitely Regressing Logic
CR or reasoning is indeed a reform proposition peculiar to Abdullahi An-Na’im.84 He
defines it as “the requirement and the rationale and purpose of public policy or
legislation be based on the sort of reasoning that most citizens can accept and reject and
use to make counterproposals through public debate without reference to religious
belief as such.”85 Additional conditions are that: 1) it must function according to the
safeguards of constitutionalism, HRs and citizenship rights and 2) it must follow the
golden rule of reciprocity among citizens of the Muslim-majority state.86
Interpreting this definition, CR requires Muslims to adjust any Sharīʿa principle
or law, they wish to advance in the public sphere, to a reasonable argument, acceptable
to their fellow citizens, regardless of their religious beliefs. This new common
reasoning must not, however, oppose agreed-upon principles like mutual respect and
civility among citizens, equality, freedom of consciousness and speech and individual
autonomy. The moral behind CR is the principle of reciprocity. It dictates upon citizens
to advance policies and laws that are acceptable to others as much as they are acceptable
to their promoter.
CR definition obviously mimics John Rawls’ idea of public reason. 87 AnNa’im, however, claims creativity by showing a difference between the two concepts.
Public reason, explains An-Na’im, bars the promotion of any comprehensive religious
doctrine in its limited public fora of the judiciary, the administration and political
candidacy. CR, however, is inclusive of these doctrines and has broader public
platforms. For An-Na’im, CR permits any comprehensive doctrine, whether religious
or secular, insofar as the doctrine adjusts to the standard of common reasoning. Its
platform welcomes the deliberation of any topic, whose outcomes will be imposed on
To my knowledge, Muslim secularists, who reject the modern enforcement of Sharīʿa in Muslimmajority states, simply restrict Sharīʿa to private practice. Unlike An-Na’im, they do not suggest
alternative methods to Sharīʿa application in the public sphere. Egyptian writer Farag Fouda (19461992), for example, rejects calls for Sharīʿa enforcement on the premises that it fails to solve the
political, social and economic problems of modern Egypt. Farag Fouda, Al-Ḥaqīqa al-Ghāʾiba 29-31
(3rd ed., Dār al-Fikr lil-Dirāsāt wal-Nashr wal-Tawzīʿ, 1988).
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the society or a group of it.88 This difference, I argue, is not entirely true. Like AnNa’im, Rawls accepts the deliberation of any comprehensive doctrine on the condition
of common reasoning. He even cites An-Na’im and Ṭaha on the use of the universal
Meccan verses as a successful Islamic example for the modification of a comprehensive
doctrine to suit his public reason requirements.89

A. Hypocrisy in the Public Discourse
An-Na’im’s CR proposal appears to establish a morality of deliberation; all public
discourse in his utopian state must be reasonable, considerate of the views and beliefs
of others and non-repugnant to the principles of the three conditions of
constitutionalism, HRs and citizenship rights. The changes that this morality imposes
on Sharīʿa are liberalist in their conceptual content. They coincide with Jurgen
Habermas’ modification of Rawls’ public reason. Habermas accepts the democratic
participation of monotheistic beliefs in the public sphere. Yet, he invites monotheisms
to undergo self-modernization to realize their moral duty of recognizing other
denominations and religions, adapting to the authority of science and agreeing with
constitutional principles that are based on profane morality.90
Like Habermas, An-Na’im argues that modern readings of Sharīʿa, which
happen to be liberalist, should be taken into account when arguing for any Sharīʿabased legislation. An-Na’im, for example, contends that the modern reading of the
Islamic principle of shūra must be considered when citizens deliberate a constitutional
government. Modern shūra reading deems it a binding principle versus its historically
non-binding understanding. 91 An-Na’im makes the same argument with religious
minority rights, freedom of belief and gender equality. 92 These rights will eventually
have a liberalist reading in An-Na’im’s reform proposal.
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An-Na’im’s liberal amendment of historical Sharīʿa gives content to the three
conditions of constitutionalism, HRs and citizenship rights. The conditions in turn
govern the rules of the game for the use of CR. As such, a citizen with Islamist
leniencies deliberating with a liberalist is at a double disadvantage. First, the three
conditions have already leaned towards modern liberal readings. Second, the Islamist
cannot initially suggest her classical Sharīʿa views on the three conditions or change
the established ones. CR’s reasoning standard considers it inadmissible to argue Islam
in its own right on public affairs issues. This restrictive environment, in which Muslims
cannot express the whole truth about their ideas,93 is all too familiar atmosphere for
them. Ironically, they have a long history in developing methods to live with it and even
overcome it. Taqiyya (precautionary dissimulation) and Fiqh al-Tamkīn (FT)
(empowerment jurisprudence) are two known methods that dissenting Muslims have
been using to cope with their secularly oppressive environments.
Taqiyya has been a traveling concept since its beginning at around 8th century
Islam. 94 At that time, Taqiyya rose among the doctrines of Shīʿism and it meant
concealment of one’s beliefs to avoid Sunnī persecution. The fight for power between
the Shīʿis and Sunnīs had often culminated in the assassination of the Shīʿi imāms and
the persecution of their followers. The slaying of the Prophet’s grandson, the third imām
al-Ḥusayn and his followers in 680 at the hands of the second Sunnī caliph Yazīd b.
Muʿāwiya (647-683) is a constant reminder of Sunnī brutality. 95 To escape Sunnī
oppression, Shīʿī jurists permitted Shīʿī followers to pretend belief in Sunnism. Verse
16:106 of the Qurʾān gives religious validity to Taqiyya. 96 The verse pardons true
believers who are forced to renounce God from the sin of disbelief.

With time, Taqiyya gained a more mystical meaning as the protection it gave
the imām was extended to his knowledge. It sheltered his esoteric beliefs from the
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violation of those inferior in spirit. Shīʿī acolytes are to prove their worth before lifting
the veils of Taqiyya in order to initiate them into the imām’s knowledge. 97 Today,
Taqiyya bears the meanings of hypocrisy and deception for personal gain. 98
Orientalists, Islamophobes and American military personnel fighting Muslims view
Taqiyya in its new meaning an inherent quality in Muslim character. They often invoke
it to justify their intended positions towards Muslims like rescinding on international
agreements and supporting anti-Islamist oppressive governments.99

FT is a more developed stratagem to face oppressive secularism. It is not a new
practice in Muslim history, but its term is. FT was coined in the 20th century following
the demise of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924. Islamist movements, like MB, consider it
a religious duty to establish a caliphal succession to the Ottomans. Meanwhile, native
nationalist movements have been thwarting Islamist designs. They opt for a secular
republic in place of a religious caliphate. This clash of ideologies has hardly witnessed
any civil deliberations. Rather, bloodshed and persecution.100
In this oppressive environment, modern Sharīʿa scholars forward FT as a means
towards realizing their rule-of-Islam goal. FT proposes Islamist participation in secular
politics until a complete Islamic tamkīn (empowerment) is possible.101 Following FT
stratagem, Islamists temporarily accept secular mores that are not repugnant yet
unfamiliar to Islamic conventions. The doctrines of FT, thus, tolerate election
candidacy, majority rule and partisan rivalry as a means towards advancing Islamic
laws and politics. Critics of MB participation in a secular democracy denounce FT
tactics. They view it unethical for MBs to democratically climb the ladder of power and
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then pull it up behind them.102 Once empowered, so the critics warn, the MBs will “fix”
the country.103 Depending on the gazer’s political orientation, the fix is either to end
secular corruption or democratic rule.

B. Reasoning: Logic in Infinitum
“Reasoning” in CR seems the wonder solution to all Sharīʿa’s opposition to liberal
constitutionalism. For An-Na’im, reasoning will contribute to rethinking Sharīʿa’s old
position on constitutional rights for religious minorities and equality before the law.104
Reasoning these positions would, for instance, sideline Sharīʿa’s poll tax for nonMuslims and allocate an equal share of inheritance between men and women. What is
astounding in this reasoning proposal is the omission of the historical ʿaql/naql
(reason/revelation) debate in Islam. The debate, if revisited, shows that reconfiguring
Sharīʿa along CR lines may have to confront reason-in-revelation debate anew.

Reason-in-revelation is a reason that leads to acceptable logics within the
religious assumptions that God’s speech is plausible, His creation is perfect and more
importantly He is the First Principle for any logical argument. These assumptions are
likely to rationalize Sharīʿa’s anti-liberal positions on issues like women and minority
rights rather than modify them. The reason/revelation debate centers around the
question whether divine law is known through critical thinking or the Qurʾān and the
Sunna. The Ashʿarīs, the currently dominant theological sect in Sunnī Islam, argue that
reason may be the source of laws but not those of the divine. Knowledge of divine law
must be known through revelation.105 The Muʿtazilīs along with Islamic philosophers
contend, however, that knowledge of divine law is attainable through reason as much
as revelation.

Andalusian Islamic philosopher, jurist Ibn Rushd or Averroes (1126-1198)
subscribes to the view that reason is a guide to divine truth by revelatory ordinance.
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Verse 16:125 of the Qurʾān states: “Call onto the way of thy Lord with wisdom and fair
exhortation, and reason with them in the better way.”106 Ibn Rushd interprets the verse
to be encouraging Muslims to guide people to belief by using three methods of
persuasion: the rhetorical persuasion (al-Khaṭābī), the dialectical statement (al-Jadalī)
and the demonstrative reasoning (al-Burhanī).107 Each method, comments Ibn Rushd,
is appropriate for a certain group of people. Whereas rhetorical persuasion is the method
for the public, demonstrative reasoning is the method for the philosophers. The latter
entails the use of philosophic syllogism (qiyās ʿaqlī) as a distinct method of learning
truth away from Sharīʿa’s juristic syllogism (qiyās sharʿī).108 In this sense, reasoning
boils down to logical statements that the Islamic philosophers learned from Greek
philosophy particularly that of Aristotle.109

For Ibn Rushd, these logical deductions are irrefutable even if they contradict
the statements of al-sharʿ (religious texts). Both al-sharʿ and logic, states Ibn Rushd,
demonstrate truth. If they occasionally contradict, their contradiction must be erased by
a hermeneutical rereading of al-sharʿ rather than disproving logic. 110 According to
Richard Taylor, Ibn Rushd sees no discord between Aristotelian rationalism and
Islam.111 In fact, this rationalism aids man in learning the nature of beings, which are
in turn indicative of their divine artisan, God. 112 Indeed, in Bidāyat al-Mujtahid
(Distinguished Jurist’s Primer), Ibn Rushd subscribes to the divine laws that are
contestable from An-Na’im’s perspective. Some of these are on gender inequality,
stated in the Qurʾān: female descendants receiving half the inheritance share of the male
progeny113 and a male felon receiving a commuted punishment for female homicide.114
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Relevant to my argument is that reasoning in Islamic philosophy is dependent
on logic that ends with God as its axiom. To make a persuasive argument that reaches
the truth with certitude is to make a set of logical deductions. Islamic philosophers
urged their students to study logic not only to formulate persuasive arguments but also
to arrive at the fountain of happiness, al-ḥikma (wisdom/philosophy).115 Philosophy
will eventually lead to more knowledge of beings and their divine creator. However,
one of the problems for Islamic philosophers/logicians, I claim, is to stop logical
arguments from infinitely multiplying for want of an a priori concept, a first principle
that cannot be disputed and thus forms a premise for logical statements.

For Muslim philosophers, the solution to the initial premise problem, albeit
imagined, is borrowed from Islam. Philosophers, such as, Abū Naṣr al-Farābī (872-950)
in Taḥṣīl al-Saʿāda (The Attainment of Happiness) posits God as the uncaused cause or
the ultimate/first principle to all classifications of beings and causalities. All beings,
argues al-Farābī, possess different mixtures of the four causes of intelligible beings: the
formal, the final, the efficient and the material. These causes correspond to the layman’s
question in the respective order of how, why, by whom and from what. If a layman is
able to answer these questions concerning an intelligible being, then she has full
knowledge of that being. 116 The celestial beings have the first three and lack the
material. God, on the other hand, has none of these causes for He is the uncaused cause
and the ultimate being who ends the hierarchy of existence. 117 Commenting on alFarābī’s retention of the first principle in the cosmos, Friedrich Ueberweg concedes to
the view that the necessary being (God) is an essentiality to the existence of the possible
being (all beings). He reasons:
If the possible is to exist in reality, a cause is necessary thereto. The world is
composite, hence it had a beginning, or was caused. But the series of causes and
effects can neither recede in infinitum, nor return like a circle into itself; it must,
therefore, depend upon some necessary link, and this link is the first being (ens
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primum). The first being exists necessarily; the supposition of its non-existence
involved a contradiction.118

This divine intervention into the ontological classification of beings plays also
an epistemic role in validating Sharīʿa law. In almost all law books on Islam, Sharīʿa is
known to be divided along religious-rational lines into ʿibādāt (rituals) and muʿāmalāt
(interactions). ʿIbādāt include rulings on all Muslim rituals, such as, ablution, prayers,
fasting and pilgrimage. These rulings are known to be devoid of rationale and thus no
qiyās (analogy) can be established based on them. For example, Sharīʿa jurists find no
reason in performing two prostrations for the morning prayer and four for the noon.
The number of prostrations for any additional prayers will thereby have to be a random
choice or an emulation of the Prophet’s nawāfil (additional rituals). The validity of
these rulings is a “God’s will” argument.

Muʿāmalāt comprise all non-ritual legal interaction among Muslims. This
category includes commercial, civil and criminal law interactions. Reasoning for
analogy, amendment and legislative intent is applicable to muʿāmalāt rulings. Slavery
and female concubinage were abolished from muʿāmalāt in the 19th century and the
punishment for slander was applied to wine drinking in the 7th. This category, however,
carries us to a different level of reasoning other than al-Farābī’s abovementioned
cosmic logic.119

This time, the logic is closer to that of the Islamic philosopher Shihāb al-Dīn alSuhrawardī (1154-1191). Al-Suhrawardī classifies logic into two: fiṭra (lit.
natural/instinctive) and iʿtibārāt ʿaqliyya (lit. intellectual considerations).120 Fiṭra logic
forms the direct knowledge of intelligible beings whether simple or composite, such as,
“apples are red.” 121 This logic depends on sensory perceptions. Iʿtibārāt ʿaqliyya
constitute an indirect logic that individuals attain through a chain of inferences from
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what has been acquired by means of fiṭra. Knowledge from an indirect logic can be
known by deliberation or though the instructions of a sage.122

What relates to our muʿāmalāt argument is that al-Suhrawardī’s fiṭra logic ends
the infinite regress from a being to another that is needed to prove the origins of every
being (the created/creator relationship). 123 The end is interestingly at a sensory
temporal level, that concords with the functionality of the muʿāmalāt rulings. Let us
take a hypothetical example of a car sale contract. The contract serves the function of
exchanging a car for an X sum of money. What is a contract can be known through alSuhrawardī’s indirect logic, which requires breaking up the elements of the transaction:
car, money and exchange. The three are known through his direct logic, the fiṭra.

Parties to the agreement may successfully transact their car for the money based
on the validity of their contract. They need no regressing beyond their temporal logic.
This certitude in the validity of the law lasts insofar as no dispute or a revolution occurs.
But, if either occurs, then the validity regression would pull an endless chain of
causation. A contract is valid because the law upholds the principle of respect for
contracts. Respect for contracts is valid because the law upholds the constitutional right
to property. Property rights are valid because they are part of the social contract. The
social contract is valid because it is the agreement made in the original condition. This
regression would go on, unless a decision is made to choose an imagined a priori
concept equivalent to God in Islam.

C. Can Civic Reasoning Unite the Odds?
Divine omnipresence is not inevitable for every doctrine. Although, God thankfully
prevents the chain of logic from a fateful regression, His elimination has been seriously
contemplated outside Islam. German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900)
reveals that God is dead.124 In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche renounces God as a
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ghost from this world and not from the beyond.125 God, in Nietzsche’s thought, has no
metaphysical existence. He is but a creation of the human mind to seek order to the
chaos of being. Although, this image of God is not new in the history of philosophy,126
Nietzsche’s renunciation of God and truth at the dawn of the 20th century impacted
modernism’s rejection of transcendental escapes.127 In An-Na’im’s public deliberation,
Nietzschean thought would formulate the extreme end that a reasoned Sharīʿa would
have to reconcile with. While the former rejects God and truth, the latter ascertains
them. But, is this reconciliation tenable?
Solomon is one of Nietzsche’s examples of how the idea of God comes about
in human thinking. Contemplating life, Solomon discovers that everything has a
transitory and circular character. Everything passes away and all things that come into
existence are not new. This state of repetitiveness and circularity in the world makes
Solomon think of its futility. To overcome his despair, he seeks redemption by turning
away from earthly things towards the eternal God. He believes in a monotheistic God
who divides all things into good and evil and protects him from the agonies of mortal
existence in return for his obedience.128
Nietzsche disproves Solomon’s creation of God to face the transitory nature of
being. He rather deems it man’s duty to courageously confront the chaos of being.
Following Nietzsche’s line of thinking, seeking out God would only add to man’s
servitude and not his emancipation from fear. However, this godly removal leaves us
with the question: what is the a priori concept for a disbeliever in divine existence? As
Stanley Rosen argues, Nietzsche offers none. Rosen recognizes that the foundational
thought for ratiocination (Grundgedanke) in Nietzsche’s thought is that humanity
constructs itself.129 He does not, however, clarify this self-constructivity.
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One suggestion to self-constructivity is eternal recurrence (ER).130 ER proposes
that man will live life anew in an endless rejuvenation. As seen with Solomon, man will
relive his frustration and agonies in a limitless multiplicity.131 ER mirrors a number of
key concepts in Nietzsche’s thinking. Life is immortal for there is no afterlife that will
succeed it. It centers around the renewable man not God. Man should embrace life as
the ultimate existence. He must not mortify his body, suppress his desires and sacrifice
his life to earn a hollow eschatological salvation.132

To this point, CR is a successful reform project. Nietzsche rids reasoning of
logic’s infinite regression. We could take his superman’s project as the foundation for
that logic. Towards the end of his journey to guide humanity, Zarathustra calls upon
the higher men to travel the mountain of human future. The higher men are those who
have learned contempt for the commoners’ petty virtues of patience and diligence. They
have forsaken the idea of equality before God because He is dead and that “we (the
higher men and Zarathustra) desire the superman to live.” 133 The superman is this
fearless man, who wills his freedom from the shackles of moral conventions and
religious beliefs and above all face the chaos of being.134
Yet, until the superman project accomplishes its end, Nietzsche’s criticism of
man’s knowledge appears to be the object of our research. The death of God means that
all values are no longer the creation of an eternal being but that of humans. Truth and
certainty are perspectival and changing. 135 Foucault digs deeper in understanding
Nietzsche’s view on the human acquisition of knowledge. He argues that man’s
knowledge in Nietzsche’s thinking is not derived from its object but rather from power
struggle and conflict and then imposed onto its object. It is the spark that comes out
from striking swords.136 It is to be found with politicians in their relations of struggle
and power rather than with philosophers.
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The philosophers, observes Foucault, mistakenly think that knowledge is to be
perceived in wisdom, unity, love and logocentrism.137 The last is the doctrine that all
sciences are united in a single science, the Logos.138 Whereas, in reality, Nietzsche from
a Foucauldian perspective sees that knowledge is the outcome of the hatred and the
derision of power struggle. It is thus arbitrary and constantly changing depending on
power relations.139 Moreover, Nietzsche declares in 109 of The Gay Science that the
world has a chaotic existence. It lacks order, organization, beauty and wisdom. It does
not observe any laws.140
Nietzsche’s positions on the source of human knowledge, the disorganization
of the world and above all the death of God pose a challenge for Islam. They are the
total opposite of the orthodox Islamic perceptions on knowledge, the world and God.
Truth in Sharīʿa has a static existence but a dynamic exploration. This is outlined in the
Ḥadīth: “Whoever practices ijtihād and he is correct, then he will be twice rewarded.
Whoever practices ijtihād and he is mistaken, then he will receive a single reward.”141
The Ḥadīth gives the mujtahid a reward for ijtihād and another for finding the right
divine law on her issue.
The Prophet’s reward distribution reveals that there is a fixed truth discoverable
by ijtihād. Although ijtihād in practice may succumb to power struggle in the
production of knowledge, the common notion is that the mujtahid is only deriving truth
form the revelatory sources of the Qurʾān and the Sunna. Moreover, the
abovementioned Muslim philosophers think in terms of unity of knowledge; all
sciences are interrelated, and they can be reduced to theology. The world is God’s
creation. Every intelligible being came into existence through emanation from the
Divine.142 Since the world eventually emanates from His perfect being and it is proof
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to the greatness of His craftsmanship, then the world is perfectly organized even if it
may appear otherwise.143 To contemplate the world is to know God.

How can a CR-practicing polity reconcile Islam with Nietzschean thought?
Habermas promotes a solution that An-Na’im’s reciprocity doctrine is likely to uphold;
both the religious and the secularist citizens would metamorphose to meet on a middle
ground. The religious would yield to the fallibilism of her belief and the secularist to
cognitive openness.144 As such, the religious would cease to believe that her religion
monopolizes truth and the secularist would be ready to learn from the religious
experiences of her opponent. Would followers of these determined thinkers
compromise? Could this self-modernization occur without self-annihilation? It remains
to be seen.
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IV. Objectivity: Real or Imagined?
HRs advocates view Islam as the source of objectionable laws. Michael Ignatieff, for
example, counts Islam as one of the three ideologies that challenge the prevalence of
HRs across the globe.145 He cites the example of Saudi Arabia’s objection to Articles
16 and 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) to prove his Islamic
challenge claim. Article 16 relates to the right of free marriage choice and 18 to the
freedom of religion. Saudi Arabia refuses to ratify both articles on grounds that limiting
women’s choice in marriage maintains patriarchal property146 and that Sharīʿa forbids
apostacy.
A more scathing criticism of the Saudi government comes from the Committee
Against Torture, the body that supervises the member states’ compliance to the
Convention Against Torture (CAT). In 2016, the Committee criticized the corporal
punishments of Saudi Criminal Law. It cited precisely Sharīʿa-based penalties of
flogging, stoning and amputations as punishments in violation of the Convention.147
These penalties are not only confined to the ḥudūd crimes, but extend to taʿzīr and
qiṣaṣ. Whereas the ḥudūd are prescribed in the Qurʾān, taʿzīr is left to the discretionary
powers of the judge and qiṣaṣ is a jus talionis punishment. An infamous taʿzīr
punishment in Saudi Arabia is the sentencing of Saudi blogger Ra’if Badawi to 10 years
in prison and 1000 lashes for the charge of insulting Islam. 148 Another qiṣaṣ case
sentenced a man to partial paralyses for paralyzing another in a knife fight.149

A. Reconciling the Contraries
How to resolve the contradiction between Sharīʿa and HRs laws is the concern of the
Sharīʿa reconciliation movement. The Sharīʿa reconciliation reformists are many and
few at the same time. They are many in that they embrace HRs principles but a few in
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suggesting methods to implement these principles in a Sharīʿa context. Every
suggestion is abandoned in its infancy due to too many valid criticisms. The reformists,
for example, neglect Ṭaha’s technique of Meccan/Medinan distinction. Ṭaha builds his
technique on the proposal that the Meccan principles on piety, justice and mercy
abrogate the Medinan laws, stipulating Sharīʿa’s criminal, commercial and personal
status laws.150 Ṭaha’s proposition has a serious drawback. The abrogation of Sharīʿa
laws is a controversial issue in Islam. 151 A further delving into it is likely to face
opposition. This is especially true as the Medinan verses were revealed after the
Meccan, whereas the rule for the abrogated and the abrogating is that the former
precedes the latter in time.
Sachedina is one of the HRs advocates in Islam, who suggest a Qurʾān-based
alternative solution to reconciling classical Sharīʿa with universal HRs. In Islam and
the Challenges of Human Rights, Sachedina argues that the conception of man in Islam
is that of an upright individual. Verse 30:30 defines man as born “a human by nature
upright-God’s original [nature] upon which He created humankind.” 152 Sachedina
deems this upright conception fiṭrat-allah (the nature of God), which God has created
in man. Fiṭrat-allah is man’s original nature. It induces him to achieve a balance
between the known convictions and the unknown moral judgements through a
reflective process.

Sachedina concludes from the fiṭrat scheme that the moral norms in Islam are
not a decided sum of rules to be known from the Islamic texts. Rather, these norms are
to be learned through reflection and deliberation of their consequences in their social
context. Additionally, Sachedina asserts that the Qurʾān invites all humankind of
different cultures to seek a universal ideal out of the diverse human conditions.153 This
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invitation would encourage people to construct a common ethical language as they
work together to create the just society.154

Khaled Abou El Fadl, another advocate of HRs in Islam, provides a more
precise argument and a decisive position on Sharīʿa’s controversial law than those of
Sachedina. He asserts human agency in determining divine law. This agency is already
divinely recognized in the Qurʾānic verse 2:30. The verse narrates that, upon the
creation of Adam, God announces to the angels that He will create a viceroy on earth.155
Accordingly, man, by divine ordinance, is God’s viceroy. He is responsible for his
action, even if his action is simply the application of a ruling, ordained by divine text.
Man is also bound by the dictates of mercy, which Abou El Fadl explains as “a
state in which the individual is able to be just with him- or herself and others by giving
each individual person his or her due.”156 For Abou El Fadl, mercy is a principle in
Islam that requires justice with others despite differences of creed and race. This is
necessarily so as God states in verses 49:13 that He has created humankind in diverse
nations and tribes. Abou El Fadl finds this verse sanctifying human diversity. Hence,
humans are obligated to genuinely perceive each other with patience and respect.157

Abou El Fadl proposes that Muslims put primacy to justice over law. In this
order, divine law would be known if it agrees with justice, instead of justice being
known from Sharīʿa law. This order would force Muslims to question what constitutes
justice according to their temporal context to arrive at their moral commitments.158 But
what if the perceived moral commitment contradicts with a divine law? What if
Muslims arrive at the principle that people have the right to their intellect, while Sharīʿa
stipulates the killing of an apostate?
Abou El Fadl offers the Muʿtazilī answer that the authenticity of divine text
ought to be reviewed or its meaning re-interpreted to agree with a perceived human
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right. 159 Although Abou El Fadl does not necessarily recommend following the
Muʿtazilī solution, he concurs with Muʿtazilism on the need for Muslims to recognize
the existence of moral values, such as, justice and goodness.160 He also sees importance
in developing the Muʿtazilī principle of enjoining the good and forbidding the bad to
become the basis for natural law in Islam. This law would recognize unassailable rights
that override any opposing Sharīʿa laws.161

B. Muʿtazilism and the Quest for Objective Values
It is surprising for those who believe that divine law embodies the ultimate justice to
seek a natural law for Sharīʿa. Sharīʿa, the divine law for Muslims, in a pre-colonial
encounter (18th century) did not recognize a positive/natural law bifurcation. No higher
law like natural law was ever thought to be needed to save Muslims from Sharīʿa laws.
Ṭaha ʿAwaḍ, a pro-Muʿtazilī academic, 162 explains that the Ashʿarīs and Ahl alSunna

163

theologians

believe

that

God

is

the

ḥākim

(adjudicator/decider/ruler/legislator). There is no place for a positive/natural law
legislation. Sharīʿa, according to these theologians, is the positive law for Muslims. It
is the expression of God’s will, articulated in the Qurʾān and the Sunna. Where the text
is silent on a questionable issue, ijtihād (juristic exposition of God’s law) is tasked with
learning God’s will to solve this issue.164 To think of a higher law in an Ashʿarī context
is to engage in the absurd.

Not all Muslims, however, subscribe to this old Ashʿarī thinking. Muslims
appear to be split into shades of conservatism and liberalism. The conservative
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“extreme” advocates al-ḥākamiyya lillah (sovereignty to God) 165 to reject the
application of secular laws where the text articulates a position. The liberal “extreme”
considers the text a historical work, whose laws are no longer applicable, except
perhaps on the ritual plane. “Moderate” liberals seek a higher law, call it natural or
divine, to save them from the perceived injustices and rights infringements of Sharīʿa
application. They even need it to protect the right to dissent from mere Sharīʿa law
enforcement.

The search for bioethics in Islam reflects liberal revulsion to the application of
Sharīʿa’s corporeal punishments. Countries applying Sharīʿa’s criminal law penalties,
like Saudi Arabia, seek out hospitals and physicians to amputate and maim convicted
felons. The request has been shocking for many doctors operating in Saudi Arabia.166
Physicians, who refuse to cooperate on this issue, make the excuse that felons are no
patients and amputating them has no medical benefit.167 Their objection has initiated
the search for bioethical precedents in Islamic history to support their dissent. Some
scholars came up with the four principles of beneficence, nonmaleficence, justice and
autonomy. They entrench them in Qurʾānic arguments to justify the physicians’ rights
to refrain from physically harming healthy people.168

The way out of this medical impasse is the employment of nonmedical
professionals to carry out Sharīʿa’s corporeal punishments.169 Yet, Muʿtazilī thinking
is seen as the greater savior of Muslim liberals from the reprehensible outcomes of
Sharīʿa enforcement. ʿAwaḍ cites Muʿtazilī theology as counter Ashʿarī thinking. In his
view, the Muʿtazilīs believe that there is a perceivable divine wisdom that guides nature
and the cosmos.170 Deeds have intelligible intrinsic values that agree with this wisdom
and that the human mind is capable of learning, independent of the religious text. This
proposal suggests the existence of knowable objective values like the evaluative
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statements that “murder is bad” and “charity is good.” The human mind is capable the
learning the badness in murder and the goodness in charity independent of any divine
ordinance and prohibition. God’s law is simply an indicator to these values rather than
a foundation for them.171
In Muʿtazilī thought, claims ʿAwaḍ, there are two modes of knowledge
acquisition: an a priori (al-badāha) and an inquisitive (al-iktisāb). An a priori
knowledge is that which needs no proof. It encompasses general values, such as, the
ugliness of deceitfulness and the goodness of truthfulness.
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The inquisitive

knowledge is that which requires investigation to reach a decision. This knowledge
covers all particular acts that do not qualify as generalities. According to the Muʿtazilīs,
the two modes are interrelated as every inquisitive knowledge has an a priori origin
supporting it.173 If a Muslim, for example, thinks that corporeal punishments are good,
then it must go back to a certain general value that she has learned a priori, such as,
deterrence from crime necessitates harsh punishments.174
The question for us today is whether the Muʿtazilīs would flout Sharīʿa’s
criminal law injunctions, if found disagreeing with today’s perceived objective values?
It is difficult to find an answer to this question from the few extant Muʿtazilī works,
which mostly focus on broad theological issues. Historically, the Muʿtazilī exegete Abū
al-Qāsim al-Zamakhsharī (1075-1144) takes corporeal punishments for granted. For
instance, on qiṣaṣ, he accepts an eye for an eye punishment. He only takes issue with
the inequality between the souls of women and men. Men are superior to women.
Killing a man for murdering a woman defies qiṣaṣ’ equality principle. Al-Zamakhsharī
resolves this issue by suggesting that the avenger (the woman’s relative) pardons the
male aggressor out of charity.175
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Most of the other extant Muʿtazilī works are political and theological. It is
difficult to relate them to specific HRs rulings without fresh hermeneutics. Politically,
the Muʿtazilīs use the Qurʾānic principle of enjoining the good and forbidding the bad
to license Muslim uprisings against an unjust ruler. Their only revolt condition is
acquiring sufficient force to withstand the ruler’s aggression. 176 Additionally, the
Muʿtazilīs promote man’s free will against the determinism of the Jabriyya theologians.
The principle of free will recognizes man’s autonomy in choosing his action and
renders him responsible for their outcomes. Determinism claims that all actions are
God’s creation and man is hardly responsible for committing them. The Umayyad
rulers (r. 661-750) are said to have advocated Jabriyya to absolve themselves of the
atrocities committed against their opponents,177 especially the Shīʿīs. Free will was the
Muʿtazilī method to avert determinism and highlight the Umayyad’s political and
criminal responsibility.
Theologically, the Muʿtazilīs argue the createdness of the Qurʾān to distinguish
God from His divine word. 178 The distinction is crucial for Muslims because it
maintains the fundamental precept of the oneness of God. The confession of faith in
Islam is through the oneness declaration: God is the only eternal being and He begets
not nor is He begotten. To believe that anyone or anything shares His eternity is to
become a disbeliever from an Islamic perspective.
Avoiding an act of disbelief, the Muʿtazilīs insisted that God’s Qurʾānic word
was created at a certain time. It does not share in God’s eternity and thus subject to a
hermeneutical reading of its text. Most of the Muʿtazilī hermeneutics focus on exalting
God by denying the literalism of His anthropomorphic attributes, mentioned in the
Qurʾān. The Muʿtazilīs read God’s Qurʾānic attributes like the Seer, the Listener and
the Seated as figurative definitions of His ultimate power and perfection. For example,
verse 48:10 which states that “God’s hand is over their hands” is an expression of divine
omnipotence.179 Muʿtazilism witnessed a sharp fall in fame and name due to the official
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adoption of the Qurʾānic createdness creed in 827. All judges and jurists were required
to submit to the createdness creed or face torture and imprisonment. 180 This inquisition
tarnished the Muʿtazilīs’ reputation, led to their persecution in the post-inquisition
period and contributed to the extinction of their theological school around the 10th
century.

C. Is Objectivism Tenable?
The purported purpose for reviving Mu’tazilism is to converge with universal HRs as
expounded in UDHR and subsequent instruments, such as, civil and political, child and
women’s rights. Islamic HRs reformists view many of the values rooted in HRs
instruments as carrying no cultural bias. Hence, Muʿtazilī objective values would easily
accord with HRs, once the putative Muʿtazilī hermeneutics are applied to Sharīʿa’s
rulings. Naturally, the objectivity of HRs values has its critics, who argue that most
HRs mirror Western values. 181 Yet, none of these critics asks the question whether
attaining objectivism is possible. As will be discussed below, the differences over the
objectivity of morality and our perception of values prove that objectivism is untenable,
perhaps none existent.

Objectivity sceptics in non-Muslim cultures fully believe that objectivity is a
fictional concept, made to universalize a purely subjective viewpoint through the
powers of false persuasion. Alasdair MacIntyre, for example, regards human
knowledge of truth a movement among narratives. Every human realization of a
previously unknown knowledge is a movement from one narrative to another. Hamlet,
the Shakespearean tragic hero, is MacIntyre’s example on narrative traveling. Hamlet
lives multiple revelations of the truth concerning the murder of his father, the innocence
of his mother and the culpability of his uncle. In each revelation, he journeys from one
narrative to another. His realization that there is no existence outside these narratives
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to enable him to learn the truth is, from MacIntyre’s viewpoint, a sign of true
knowledge.182

Those who think otherwise, like Jane Austen’s Emma, are living a fiction in
MacIntyre’s opinion. Emma finds “truth” by exposing all deceptions. But upon
reaching this point, Emma does not arrive at the state of objectivity from which
everyone ought to view the truth. Rather, Austen, the author, has replaced one
interpretation with another.183 Hence, for MacIntyre and other deconstructionists, the
objectivity problem is with the reader or the legal actor who places herself outside and
even above her contemplated text. She falsely stands somewhere at a vantage point
from which she can deconstruct all texts but her vision of them. While everybody is
subjective, she is objective. Placing herself outside the range of deconstruction
undermines deconstruction itself. It reduces deconstruction to an instrument or a theory
among many, rather than an all-encompassing criticism.184

MacIntyre does not trump objectivity altogether. He suggests new but rather
cryptic narratives towards objectivity: the tradition and the comparative. 185 The
tradition narrative assumes that traditions are not monolithic blocks of a single
narrative. They rather contain an accumulation of narratives, each built on the other.
An evaluation of the theory that shapes each narrative within a tradition is continuous
and dialectic and hence capable of discovering an objective argumentation. 186 The
comparative narrative recognizes human capacity for constructing histories. These
histories form comparative narratives that can expose the anomalies of each tradition
and even force a crisis into it by suggesting a cognitive method.187
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The Marxists are the strongest skeptics of PIL and its concomitant claims of
universality and objectivity. Soviet legal philosopher Evgeny Pashukanis argues that
law comes into existence through a commodity exchange form,188 when two parties
claim ownership rights over a certain property and are willing to exchange the one for
the other. The dictates of this form give rise to moralities like justice and equality. These
moralities are not the demands of humanity but that of the market. Their purpose is to
maintain the efficiency of commodity exchange among supposedly equal participants
within that market.189

Pashukanis cites the Roman laws of ius gentium (law of nations) and ius civile
(law of citizens) as examples of how law and morality are in the service of commodity
exchange. The Romans introduced ius gentium next to ius civile for mercantile
purposes. Like today’s conflict of laws, ius gentium takes into consideration nonRoman laws to promote international trade. Contrastingly, ius civile privileged Roman
citizens over foreigners and thus proved unconducive to trading with non-Romans.
Pashukanis, however, views ius gentium a law rising out of despise for foreigners,
whom the Romans think ought not to enjoy the same Roman citizenship rights.190

For Pashukanis, legal norms, such as, equity, justice, freedom and fairness
together with the concept of the state are lifeless abstractions,191 meant to conceal the
coercion of the commodity exchange form. Those who trade in the market are not all
autonomous nor all equal individuals. They vary in their bargaining power
commensurate to their potential to employ self-help. Workers are a good example of
this concealed inequality. While they sell their labor in the market, the only autonomy
they enjoy is the freedom to die of starvation.192 This is because if they do not contract
at the market’s unfair price, they are sure to die of hunger.

Yet, the principles of free competition and equality are required to establish a
successful exchange market. These principles must appear to exist and be enforced by
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a public authority that also appears distant from all market actors and neutral to their
personal interests. This market requirement for a public authority is, in Pashukanis’
view, what instituted the abstraction of the state.193 State law appears impartial towards
market actors, whereas in reality, its neutrality benefits the resource-privileged actors
by not interfering to tip the balance between these actors and the resource-deprived
ones. PIL is no different to domestic law, if viewed from a legal form perspective. Its
moralities, i.e., HRs, are those that benefit the market. PIL has been erroneously
regarded otherwise simply because it has been viewed from a content-based
perspective.194

Supporters of objective values, on the other hand, have to deal with the
challenge of the values’ foundation. The challenge is often framed in the question: what
are the origins of morality? Answering this question provokes an array of unresolvable
debates with no tradition-independent criterion for objectivity. Two main camps stand
out in these debates: theistic voluntarism (TV) and independent moral realism (IMR).
195

TV proponents maintain that morality stems somehow from a theistic being. God,

broadly defined,196 is that being, and His morality could be known through either His
divine will or command. As divine will appears to deliver more universal morality in
face of the particulars of divine commands, it is the preferable source to follow in
learning objective morality. The question, however, is how to learn God’s will without
His command? Indeed, believers know His will through His spoken command. But
what if the perceived will contradicts with the command? Like the Muʿtazilīs, hopeful
believers in non-Muslim cultures argue that through a “correct use of human reason,”
the human mind can arrive at the same conclusions of religious texts.197

Meanwhile, IMR promotes the existence of objective morality, without being
the creation of either God or man. IMR advocates are thereby free to originate morality
anywhere outside the pale of the divine and the human. A trend in IMR thinking, for
example, renders science and reason of the age of Enlightenment the foundation for
193
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today’s objective morality.198 For this trend, moral progress is possible today because
of the historical development of natural science. IMR advocate Michael Shermer argues
that French legal philosopher Montesquieu (1689-1755) deduces his legal ideas from
the natural laws that govern societies. An instance of these deductions is the inclination
of the hunting and herding nations to war and the trading to peace.199 This is because
the hunting and herding peoples remain independent of each other, while the trading
nations are interdependent for the purposes of exchanging their goods. This distinction
has resulted in today’s trade theory of peace, which is, in Shermer’s view, a moral
progress deduced from the objective source of natural science.200

Muslim HRs reformists hardly tackle any of the ideas proposed by objectivity
skeptics or advocates. Both groups pose relevant questions to the Sharīʿa reconciliation
thesis. From the skeptics’ perspective, Muslim reformists could be falling in Emma’s
trap, a situation where they reject the subjective conservative narrative only to follow a
likewise subjective liberalist narrative. In a Pashukinian sense, the reformists have
moved from conservative religious morality to liberal market morality. Both are equally
subjective. The only achievement is Emma’s deceptive self-complacency. Also,
objectivity advocates place a challenge to objectivism rather than a solution. The
correct use of human reason in Western culture has been lending progressive moralities
from the abolishment of slavery in the US to civil rights movement in the 1960s.201 Yet,
what makes objective morality progress is likely to be a subjective factor, such as
people’s interests, sympathy or antipathy. In the slavery example, the humanity of the
slaves could not have undergone any change. Rather the perception of that humanity or
may be the interest in slave labor is the changing factor. Small wonder that the HRs
reformists are reluctant to agree with objectivity advocates on contentious issues like
recognizing LGBT rights or the prostitution profession. Both sides are supposedly
objective, but their objectivity does end them with the same conclusion.
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Conclusion
The three reform movements of Sharīʿa codification, privatization and reconciliation
are tragic in their endeavors to universalize Sharīʿa in accordance with liberal scientism.
The movements have been developing their reform proposals in a background of a
globally predominant liberalism. Both Sharīʿa and liberalism legitimize their legal
orders based on irreconcilable first principles. Sharīʿa posits God a First Principle, from
which all laws gain their validity. Liberalism insists on the futility of finding an
originary cause and thus assigns an empty slot for the First Principle. Any elected cause
can fill that slot.202 The current is humanism.203 The conflicting First Principles, God
versus humanism renders Sharīʿa and liberalism simultaneously different and similar.
They are different in their legal foundations but similar in their modus operandi. Both
claim a universal message and are adamant to continue their intellectual and physical
conquest of the world until its full and voluntary subjugation. What is ahead of them is
an apocalyptic future: either the one exterminating the other or a continuous fight to the
bitter end.

The three reform movements discussed in this thesis, if successful, are but
facilitating the elimination of Sharīʿa’s competing edge in face of liberalism. Sharīʿa
Codification eliminates the multiple narratives of classical Sharīʿa in favor of an expertcaliph determination. Historically, this determination has been ordering quietism
whenever revolt builds up among an aggrieved public such as Shīʿi Muslims. Sharīʿa
privatization shifts HRs from the topic of legal deliberation between Islamists and
secularists to the rules of conducting that very deliberation. The move makes it
impossible for Sharīʿa proponents to argue for Sharīʿa’s contestable issues, such as,
apostasy or gender inequality. Ironically, resolving these issues were the main reason
for proposing CR deliberation. Finally, Sharīʿa reconciliation is trusting in the existence
of an objective narrative in which Sharīʿa would come to terms with liberal HRs. Yet,
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the movement is actually traveling from the visibly subjective Sharīʿa narrative to the
invisibly subjective HRs narrative. 204

Liberal scientism with its aims of making national laws neutral, reasonable and
objective developed in the last century as part of liberalism’s meta narrative on the
universalization of a cosmopolitan law. The law is grounded in HRs, enunciated in
UDHR and its subsequent treaties. It transcends the civil laws of the world’s nationstates by addressing individuals qua human beings rather than citizens of specific
nations. Its purpose is to establish a global perpetual peace to prevent the recurrence of
the horrors that the world has witnessed in the two global wars of the 20th century.205
As happened in the Nuremburg and Tokyo trials, individuals of any nationality are to
be held liable for their criminal actions before an international court of law. Expounding
this originally Kantian peace project, 206 Habermas finds the First World, i.e., the
winning allies of World War II, the standard for HRs protection that must be emulated
by the rest of the world.207 To guarantee global compliance, Article 2(4) of the UN
charter outlaws war except in self-defense.
Liberalism’s peace project is detrimental to Sharīʿa as the source of legal culture
for many second and third world Muslim countries in Habermas’ state stratification.208
International criticism of Sharīʿa is increasing by the day. It censures Sharīʿa for, inter
alia, stipulating corporeal punishments and jihad; legalizing crimes against morality,
gender inequality and differential treatment of non-Muslims; prohibiting apostasy from
Islam, LGBTQ rights, interfaith marriage, prostitution and alcohol consumption;
imposing a female dress code; permitting female genital mutilation, polygamy and rote
learning of Islamic texts for minors. Although by adopting an empty-slot First Principle,
liberalism accedes to the absence of an ultimate truth, the natural outcome of being
open to pluralist cognitive suppositions does not follow from this concession.
Liberalism’s humanism taints international conflicts with a good/evil moral binary.
204
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Any opponent to liberalism is deemed an absolute enemy. War against that opponent is
justified until she is subdued, and peace prevails.209

Yet, the peace that ensues from the predominance of liberal humanism has its
insightful critics. William Rasch finds it the “peace of the graveyard.” 210 This is
because after liberalism annihilates true opposition through its good/evil moralism, it
imposes a sham pluralism under the rule-of-law (RoL) pretense. 211 True pluralism,
argues Carl Schmitt, inculcates the existence of two adversaries with opposing beliefs.
The adversaries form a friend/foe political binary rather than humanism’s good/bad
division. No moral attributes are attached to the enemy in Schmitt’s political binary.
She is never demonized and thus retains her equal right to fight a war in the existential
sense in order to impose her beliefs.212 The de-moralization of war is due to the absence
of an impartial truth or sovereign that can evaluate conflicting beliefs. Who is good?
Who is bad? It cannot be decided for there is no universally acknowledged good.213

In place of Schmitt’s pluralism, liberal democracies, argues Rasch, have
propagated a sham pluralism of the government/opposition binary. 214 This binary
presupposes the existence of opposing views advanced in peaceful debates in
recognized platforms like parliaments, unions and media outlets. Each side has the right
to come to power through a defined peaceful procedure. This form of peace politics is
carried out under the RoL rubric, a legal order that claims calculability, rationality and
neutrality through the scientism of law. Yet, the RoL is deceptively neutral and
pacifist. 215 As in Sharīʿa privatization proposals, opposition within a RoL must be
homogenized with the conditions of liberal constitutionalism, citizenship rights and
HRs. These conditions thwart debates on almost all of the abovementioned contested
Sharīʿa issues. Since these conditions cannot be intellectually valid within a discourse
that recognizes the lack of an absolute truth, then their imposition cannot be by
persuasion.
209
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If not by persuasion, then the question now is how does the RoL rule? Forced
suicide seems to be the answer coming from Muslim-majority nations, where the RoL
doctrine and liberalism are struggling to make a footing in a thriving friend/enemy
politics. Turkey is one of these nations, whose Islamist politicians have endeavored to
reconcile Islamism with liberalism in an environment of hostility between the two
camps. Yet, reviewing Turkey’s modern politics exposes the impossibility of
reconciling Islamist and liberalist ideologies. MB Turkish President Recep Tayyib
Erdogan, who promised the reconciliation, proved to be committing a forced suicide;
he had to negate his ideology and embrace that of his opponents to disempower them.
But, by doing so, he neither upheld the rule of Islam nor the RoL.

Following the abolishment of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924, the Turkish
Constitution embraced French-modelled secularism (Laiklik). Turkish secularism is
defined as assertive in that it is aggressive towards religion rather than neutral.216 As
the Turkish Constitutional Court affirms, “[t]he dominant and effective power in the
state is reason and science, not religious rules and injunctions.”217 The Turkish army
deems itself the guardian of secularism against reactionary and unscientific thought, a
common reference to the socialist and Islamic propositions in the public sphere. From
1960 to 2016, the military has conducted about five coup d’états against democratically
elected governments.218 The 1960 coup aimed to thwart any political concessions to
Islam in the public sphere. It resulted in the execution of prime minister Adnan
Menderes.219 The 1997 coup deposed the Islamist government of Necmettin Erbakan
for wanting, inter alia, to strengthen ties with the Islamic East instead of the secular
West. Erbakan’s party (Welfare Party) was disbanded by a court order in the following
year.
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Turkey’s application for EU membership in the 1999 Helsinki summit changed
the fortunes of Islamist politics in Turkey. To gain accession in the EU, Turkey had to
meet the Copenhagen criteria, which insist on the adoption of thin and thick
democracies. The former is procedural and amounts to a fair electoral process, while
the latter is substantive and demands a true polyarchy and RoL. 220 These values,
comments Turkish scholars, have to be not just implemented but “internalized” in the
sense of being perceived as intrinsically valuable. 221 For Turkish Islamists, thin
democracy is an advantage but the thick is problematic. On the thin side, the inclusion
of Islamists in the electoral process meant the protection of their parties from
continuous disbandment at the hands of the secularist military and judiciary. The thick
side, however, is boon and bane. It is advantageous in keeping the Turkish military, a
staunch opponent to Islamism, out of politics.222 Yet, it is disadvantageous in counting
Islam not as an overarching truth but an ideology among many in a pluralist system.

The drawback of thick democracy puts Islamist politics in a difficult situation;
while their Islamist constituency expects an Islamic role in the public sphere, the EU
presumes an undefined pluralism. In 2002, 223 the Justice and Development Party
(AKP), a branch of the Welfare, came to power through parliamentary elections. Its
leader and the then prime minister Erdogan presented Islam as a system of personal
values rather than political governance. 224 This proposal received a warm welcome
from Turkish secularists and the Europeans. It meant that Islam is finally absorbed in a
consolidated liberal democracy by containing it within the private sphere.225
However, how Islamic is AKP’s proposal is still a contested issue. Erdogan and
his mentor Erbakan are followers of the MB’s Islamist ideology.226 It is part and parcel
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of their political participation goals to establish the Islamic caliphate and to enforce
Sharīʿa in the manner of ʿAwda’s codification.227 Since Erdogan’s accession to power
in 2002, none of these major goals have been achieved. Quite the contrary, his
government has banned capital punishment as part of the “harmonization laws” with
the EU’s HRs requirements.228 The ban is in stark contrast with ʿAwda’s criminal code
that stipulates capital punishment for homicide and some ḥudūd crimes (adultery,
apostasy and armed robberies).

Erdogan did not quit his Islamization project altogether. His Islamic reforms
focus more on minor MB issues. He, for example, lifted the ban on headscarf for police
officers, expanded the Sunnī Muslim religious schools and restricted the sale and
consumption of alcoholic drinks. 229 In explaining the evolution of Islamist partisan
thinking in Turkey, Ziya Onis observes that Islamist politicians are usually “reformist
fundamentalists” at the beginning of their career but shift to “liberal Islamists” as they
become seasoned in real politics. This difference is between politicians wanting to
overturn the political system and those wishing to introduce mere cultural changes.230

The price for this ideological change is a political suicide in Erdogan’s case.
Erdogan could not deliver his promises on either side. Today, he is criticized for failing
in the EU accession negotiations, blocked in 2013, and for changing his authority from
democratic to authoritarian. He would not leave office at the end of his term.231 His
fears of a Menderes-like execution, imprisonment or loss of social status once out of
office have driven him to conduct a zero-sum game politics. Karabekir Akkoyunlu et
al. define these fears as “existential insecurities” to explain Erdogan’s intensifying
authoritarianism in the 2010s. 232 Erdogan used the 2016 coup to round up thousands of
his Islamist, secularist and Kurdish opponents. He also made the Turkish parliament

Ḥasan al-Banna, Majmuʿat Rasāʾil al-Imām al-Shahīd Ḥasan al-Banna 212, 227 (Dār al-Daʿwa
wal-Nashr, 1998).
228
Supra note 221, at 12.
229
Karabekir Akkoyunlu & Kerem Oktem, Existential Insecurity and the Making of a Weak
Authoritarian Regime in Turkey, 16 Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 504, 512-4 (2016).
230
Ziya Onis, Political Islam at the Crossroads: From Hegemony to Co-existence, 7 Contemporary
Politics 281, 291 (2001).
231
In 2014, Erdogan changed the Turkish political system from parliamentarian to presidential as he
changed office from prime minister to president.
232
Supra note 229, at 507-9.
227

56

abandon its immunity only to press charges of terrorism and treason against its
opposition members.233

The fall of Turkish democracy is often attributed to reasons peculiar to Turkey.
Akkoyunlu et al. find the Turkish failure due to the all-or-nothing politics of Islamism
and liberal secularism in the absence of a societal power to put an end to this vicious
circle. 234 The scholars, however, stop short from explaining why is Turkish democracy
an all-or-nothing politics? The reason is nothing peculiar to Turkey and is thus likely
to occur elsewhere. Combining the RoL and the rule of Islam is an enterprise doomed
to failure. Each belongs to an ideology that claims a domineering first principle and is
willing to fight a “just” or a jihadi war to realize that dominance. And war is exactly
what Turkey has been creating in the last 10 years. Apart from its domestic fights with
Kurds and Gulenists, 235 Turkey occupies northern Syria to establish safe zones; 236
sends militias to support the internationally recognized MB government in Libya,
occasionally bombs Kurdish outposts in northern Iraq and supports Azerbaijan’s fight
against Armenian separatists in Nagorno-Karabakh. Ironically, instead of Turkey
becoming a source of Habermas’ perpetual peace, it has become a source of perpetual
violence, conducted at times under the banner of “Islamism,” “nationalism” and at
others under “humanism.”
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